

The Paradox of Angola: Interlocking Spheres of War and Peace

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Abstract:

Peace seems to be an elusive dream in Angola. In an attempt to grasp some of the complexities of this deep and protracted conflict, this paper starts by taking a look at the crisis of the African State ; an entity which often appears marooned by the storms of political, social, economic and (at times) ethnic violence. Wading through a maze of conflict analysis, various explanations are explored as to why Angola has been besieged by a brutal civil war for 26 years. Is it the inherited history of colonisation? Is it the aftermath of the Cold War era? Is it the power-hungry egos of leadership figures? Is it failed diplomacy? Is it the abuse and exploitation of natural resources? Is it a weak civil society? Clearly, no one cause of conflict is 'water tight' and able to satisfy the many voices of frustration, trauma and despair. A combination of these explanations must be held in tension in order for Angola to build towards a process of peace. Once the appropriate explanations have been dissected, this paper suggests a way forward for embarking on a journey towards hope and peace. For Angola, this means uncovering the various 'tributaries' that feed into the river which defines a more comprehensive approach to peace. These tributaries are understood as the origins of peace, the behaviourist view of peace, the multi-track diplomacy movement, the intersection of humanitarian aid and conflict, and the emergence of African configurations of political stability. Fitting together the pieces for peace in Angola will involve a highly integrated, systems-based framework. It is best described as a matrix that entails important violence prevention components, a dedicated and pivotal leadership with strong moral and ethical vision and a highly sophisticated and trusted communication flow across all sectors and actors in the Angolan peace movement. The way forward for peace in Angola is definable – what is needed are those 'voices for peace' who are willing to risk and work hard at clearing the path for peace in this war-weary country.

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I. Introduction – Unpacking the Context

A. A Besieged & Brutal History:

Visiting Luanda, Angola in 1995, my colleague and I were waiting for our host to pick us up outside the shell of an apartment building where we had spent the night. In front of us was an expansive city street and across the street was a sprawling shack settlement. Watching Luanda come alive that early morning was like watching the teeming activity inside the brown shroud of an African ant nest. To the casual onlooker, swarms of people moved about in what at first seemed to be endless, chaotic movement - but soon it was clear that there were patterns, plans and direction to the activity.

Growing accustomed to the heat of the morning sun and the stench of sewage and garbage in the street, we peered down into a large roadside ditch full of stagnant, greenish-brown water. In the middle of this pool of water was an old rubber car tire with a coke can floating in the middle of it. Soon, two young boys appeared moving along the edge of this ditch. One boy had a tin can and the other carried a small wire sieve – the kind used to pluck fish out of an aquarium. The boy with the sieve was skimming the surface of the water and pouring the strained green slime into the tin can being carried by his partner. Trailing in the distance was an adult male seemingly the chaperon for the boys. We were at a disadvantage being unable to speak Portuguese, but being very curious, my colleague and I approached the boys. Using bits of Spanish, some Italian, and many hand motions, we started communicating and were told that the boys were actually catching or gathering something that they would later eat. When we commented on the size (“piccolo”) or amount of green/brown filmy substance in the tin can, they indicated that whatever “it” was would eventually grow much bigger (“grande”). According to them, eventually a tadpole or fish would emerge. What amazing entrepreneurship and visionary fortitude, I thought to myself, as I watched their careful endeavours. It may be a long hard wait, but with hard work and patience something living and vibrant was going to emerge from their ‘organic soup.’ So too, with the peace process in Angola, I thought, as I watched the boys move on to their next ‘life’ collection site.

Angola’s history is at times perplexing and torturous. It is believed that the Bantu-speaking people groups settled in Angola about 2,000 years ago. Coming under the colonial rule of the Portuguese as early as the 1500’s, Angola became one of the major sources of slave labour for the Portuguese colony of Brazil by the 1600’s. In 1641, the Dutch gained control of Angola and the subsequent slave trade, but Portugal soon recaptured its grip on Angola. In the 1800’s with the decline of the slave trade, the Portuguese instituted an assimilated form of agricultural colonisation. Portuguese farmers were sent to Angola to grow maize, sugar cane and tobacco. Many of these farmers also intermarried with the Angolans.¹

In the 1920’s, Angola’s economy was given a boost with the coming of industrialisation. Under the rule of Portugal’s dictator, Antonio de Oliveira Salazar, thousands of Portuguese moved to Angola and started businesses there. The 1950’s heard rumblings of unrest and demands for independence. Out of this seedbed of discontent the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) was formed and an armed struggle against the Portuguese began. By 1961, due to

cultural and political differences, the rebel movement divided into three groupings – the MPLA, the FNLA (Front for the Liberation of Angola) and UNITA (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola). At the time of independence from the Portuguese in 1975, agreements were brokered for Angola to be governed by a power-sharing agreement between the three rebel movements. This did not materialise and civil war erupted. In 1976, MPLA claimed victory and set up a Marxist regime under the leadership of Augustino Neto, but the FNLA and UNITA continued to battle against the new government. In 1981, the FNLA's efforts collapsed but UNITA has continued the struggle through guerrilla warfare mainly fought in the outlying bush and rural provinces for the past 26 years.² There have been three major attempts at ending Angola's civil war. The first of these is referred to as the Gbadolite Accords (1989), the second was the Bicesse Accords (1990-91) and the third is the Lusaka Protocol (1994).

In 1995, it was estimated that 3 million people were living in Luanda. This is a city whose infrastructure was built to accommodate about 400,000 people, (the size of population in 1975 when the Portuguese left.) Now, it is estimated to have 5 million people (out of a total national population of 12 million people) living there. People come to the city to flee the protracted civil war and in search of work. It is believed that there are about 2.7 million internally displaced persons in Angola. According to international economic indicators, Angola, regardless of its very rich mineral and oil resources, is essentially bankrupt. With inflation at 900% at one point in 1995, changing money was nearly impossible. Upon arrival we were given large bags with which to carry bundled wads of local cash. Worthless paper money was left in the streets as litter and the US dollar was the currency of choice.

Today, inflation is more under control, however, unemployment remains very high. The small percentage of those who control the country's wealth remain rich and powerful, setting up very expensive private clinics and schools or sending their children abroad for education. Yet, many motivated students still stream in and out of classes in high schools throughout the city up until 9:00 p.m. at night, in order to cope with the problem of overcrowding. During several visits to Angola I have often wondered if there would not be some way to measure the impact of the informal economic sector that is clearly active and productive, eking out an existence from morning to evening. It is this driving force in the people that seems to be the source of hope for peace in Angola.

B. A Disintegrating African State?

In considering the contextual history of Angola, one must take cognisance of the fact that much of the political order and power structures of today were inherited from previous colonial rule. Ali Mazrui, African academic and Statesman, makes an interesting comparison between the African State and a Political Refugee. He draws a number of analogies:

- **Both experience alienation** – The African State often finds a great chasm between itself and its own citizens, so also the displaced refugee feels the intense separation from his/her own family and community.
- **Both experience marginalisation** – The African State has often been “pushed into the ghetto of the world system”, it is the same with the refugee who is often torn from his/her own culture, language and customs.
- **Both experience institutional collapse, psychic bewilderment and human dislocation** – In the wake of State collapse as well as in the flight of a refugee chaos, trauma and great suffering can occur.
- **Both need the moral space to recover their sense of balance** – Safety, tolerance and peace must be established in order for a State to re-order itself, likewise, the refugee needs these things in order to rebuild their lives.
- **Both experience crossing of borders and seeking asylum in other lands** – The African State represented in an exiled struggle movement may find itself outside of its own country likewise, a refugee, fleeing the threat of violence and death will often find himself / herself in a foreign land.³

Mazrui outlines six ideal functions of the State. These are: 1.) Sovereign control over territory, 2.) Sovereign oversight and supervision of national resources, 3.) Effective and rational revenue extraction from people, goods and services, 4.) Capacity to build and maintain adequate national infrastructure, 5.) Capacity to render social services, and 6.) Capacity for governance and maintenance of law and order. Many of these functions are non-existent or highly strained in the conflict spots across Africa. Why? Mazrui would suggest that Africa is still trying to find its balance – a balance that at the moment is hanging in limbo, suspended on a political tightrope between *too much* government which often results in tyranny and *too little* government which often results in anarchy.⁴ The equation is often confused because much of what is known as state government structure is a legacy of colonial rule and various other imported forms of communism, socialism, democracy, and electoral or multi-party systems. Many of these hybrid government configurations are either not fully effective and/or not appropriate for the African context. This lack of an appropriate and contextual political ‘mix’, is an important backdrop to the discussion of peace in Angola.

II. Unravelling the Angolan Paradox

A. Frameworks for Analysis:

Before launching into the specifics of the Angolan conflict, it would be important to identify and categorise some of the more popular lenses through which conflict is often analysed.

1. Traditional Diagnosis – Power, Knowledge and Relationships

Adam Curle, a Quaker and one of the oldest voices in the peace movement, suggests that there are three variables that must be considered in the process of conflict analysis and resolution. The three variables are the issues of power, knowledge and relationships. Curle points out that peace depends on the balance / equality of power, the awareness level of the affected people, and the nurturing of peaceful relationships. The inverse is also true. War results from the imbalance / inequality of power, the lack of awareness on the part of affected peoples, and the escalation of violence in relationships.⁵

Similarly, the Harvard Negotiation Project uses the following categories for conflict analysis:

- ◆ **The Parties and their Interests** – Who are they? How are they organised? How do they make decisions? What is their power base? What do they want? Do other stakeholders exist?
- ◆ **The Relationships** – How was the relationship in the past? How is the relationship now? How would they like it to be in the future? How is the communication between all the parties involved?
- ◆ **The Substance** – What are the issues? What are the stated positions? What values and needs are driving the conflict? What are the stereotypes or prejudices? What are the shared or common ground areas of agreement?
- ◆ **The History and Context** – What is the history? What were the stages in the progression of the conflict? How have changes in the environment affected the conflict? Where did communication and trust breakdown?
- ◆ **The Strategies, Structures and Resources Available** – What forums exist through which third-party representatives can be involved in solving the conflict? What alternatives are there if the conflict cannot be solved?⁶

In general, the approaches described above are found in abundance in the literature of the conflict transformation field⁷ and are the starting point in global diplomacy and the study of international relations. Much of the published writing on the Angolan situation has been angled from this perspective and often confined to rather narrow political and diplomatic state negotiations, military agreements and UN Security Council resolutions. These traditional, “logic” containers for analysis assume a certain degree of rationality in process, and endorsement by reasonable, co-operative political actors.

More and more this is not the case as the world is rocked by the waves of unexpected, complex and unexplainable

violence sweeping across the globe. Increasingly diplomats and on-the-ground practitioners of conflict transformation are looking into other fields and other disciplines to try and understand, quantify and categorise the conflicts they find themselves engaging with. Angola is no exception.

2. The 'Ripeness Factor' Theory

In an attempt to make sense of a stained history of failed intervention efforts in what seem to be incomprehensible, protracted conflicts, some academics and practitioners have subscribed to a theory labelled 'The Ripeness Factor.' This idea maintains that violent conflicts have a life-cycle of their own and that intervention is only successful when the conflict and the conflicting parties arrive at a "hurting stalemate" in the conflict. The concept of 'hurting stalemate' is described by author Fen Osler Hampson as follows, "...*ripeness suggests that a conflict has reached a new equilibrium in which the parties are seriously committed to laying down their arms because they are exhausted by war.*"⁸ Hampson goes on to critique this theory by observing that, "*Yet...in low-intensity conflict situations the ability and willingness of the parties to sustain an ongoing campaign of violence is formidable even after negotiations have begun.*"⁹ Angola is a case-in-point of this very critique. The following extract bears this out:

*"In Angola, that the military situation was ostensibly at a stalemate during the negotiation of Bicesse Accords did little to advance the peace process and enhance the possibilities of achieving a durable settlement. In the period of 1988-91 the military situation had remained largely balanced; neither side had been able to gain a sufficient strategic advantage despite repeated offensives by the MPLA and UNITA. Military and civilian casualties were enormous; the war had exacted a huge toll on the country's economy. One might have thought that the stalemate would have enhanced the prospects of achieving a durable settlement; in fact, it had quite the opposite effect. Almost immediately after a settlement was reached, each side took advantage of the weak monitoring provisions in the accords to cheat on its commitment to demobilise its forces. Few of UNITA's troops were disarmed and very few were actually demobilised. There was also poor government attendance in assembly and demobilisation areas. Cease-fires were recklessly broken by UNITA and the MPLA...In this case, a hurting military stalemate apparently had little impact on the prospects of achieving a workable peace settlement."*¹⁰

Although the 'Ripeness' theory carries with it many useful components and can be applied to a number of conflict situations, it is inherently problematic. When one looks at conflicts that have been sustained for decades, causing untold devastation and misery on a nation's people, economy and any semblance of normalcy, one sees that the concept of ripeness is not always relevant. In the words of Hampson, "*Ripeness is a cultivated, not inherited, condition.*"¹¹

3. 'Mythico-Histories' and Identity Re-adjustments

"If we consider violence as a postmodern problematique, what is required to understand it is the interpretation of violence as a discourse and a semiotics, and a phenomenology in which violence is itself a mode of interpretation, with interpretation leading to violent events: protest, insurrection, terrorism." (David Apter, *Rethinking Development*)¹²

Coming from a more psycho-social vantage point, one might try to grapple with complex, protracted conflict by exploring the dimensions of myth-making, ethnic identity and enemy formation. Rene Lemarchand in his poignant analysis of the Burundi conflict, writes about how violence is in fact remembered, invented and anticipated in situations of extended war. Lemarchand's major emphasis is on how violence multiplies myth-making and conspiracy theories, which in turn become constitutive elements of further violence (justified aggression). He believes myth-making generates a constant interface between 1.) Past and Present, 2.) Discourse and Practice, and 3.) Ideology and Violence.¹³

Adding to this meta-narrative on conflict, Lemarchand throws in the thorny issues of ethnic identity, perceptions and history. My observation is that groups engaged in violent struggle often re-adjust their identities to suite their immediate needs and interests in a conflict. Lemarchand expounds on this point, "*Identities, then, like events, are reconstructed according to the norms of a dehumanising myth. Myth-making in this sense is not only a privileged field for the*

*deployment of racist ideology...it equally serves to legitimise violence.”*¹⁴ Borrowing from Liisa Malkki, Lemarchand discusses the concept of ‘mythico-histories.’ Mythico-Histories are *“a mixture of fact and fiction designed to offer each community retrospective validation of it’s own interpretation of the genesis of conflict.”*¹⁵

Two major forces that fuel the creation of mythico-histories are what is often termed cognitive dissonance and amnesia. Cognitive dissonance refers to *“the perceptual screening of dissonant facts and omitting critically important bits of evidence from the picture, making it consistent with one’s normative assumptions about the why and how of violence.”*¹⁶ Within the conflict arena, the term amnesia is not referring to the physiological process of trauma or accident that causes loss of memory, instead it points to a process of strategic, rational choices made to forget and omit segments of one’s memory/history in order to justify, motivate and mobilise prejudiced support for the accomplishment of a particular end. Lemarchand applies this kind of analysis to the Burundi case in what he calls ‘ethnic amnesia’ as described in the following quote, *“...ethnicity is better seen as the rational response of self-interested entrepreneurs to the challenge of electoral politics.”*¹⁷

Although ‘ethnic amnesia’ has never been sited as a piece of the Angolan conflict, I would venture to say that ‘political amnesia’ has certainly been part of the Angolan equation. In peace agreement after peace agreement both the MPLA and UNITA seem to “forget” from where they have come. They have forgotten concessions made in the past, they have forgotten the carnage and devastation that has wrecked their nation for almost 26 years, they have forgotten their ideals and most importantly, they have forgotten the real needs and interests of the people they claim to lead and serve. Layer all this with political myth-making and political identity re-adjustments and one can begin to see how violence and its many forms continues to be reincarnated in Angola.

B. Various Explanations for the Angolan Conflict:

1. Historical After-Taste – The Oppressive System of Colonial Rule

Much has been written on the evils of colonial rule. In Angola, aside from the obvious oppression from the Portuguese rule, there are the added traumas and social destruction brought on by slavery, mineral wealth exploitation, patrimonial corruption and high rates of illiteracy. According to Ali Mazrui, the issues around what actually constitutes ‘de-colonisation’ have changed. He asks the very relevant question, is the violence, upheaval and war that Africa is currently experiencing a sign of birth pangs (coming to maturity a generation after independence) or is it death pain (finally feeling and seeing the total and final demolition of the colonial state)? Mazrui summarises it well:

*“The question that has arisen recently is whether real decolonization is not winning formal independence by the collapse of the colonial state itself. It is not changing the guard, raising the new flag, and singing the new national anthem while leaving the old structures intact. Rather, it is the cruel and bloody disintegration of colonial structures. Decolonization should no longer be equated with political liberation.”*¹⁸

A clear application of this idea is found in the concept of patrimony as a legacy of colonial rule. In most instances, when an African state was given independence it was a turning over of political leadership without a disruption of the state structures and apparatus. This meant that a great majority of the African leaders who took over the reigns of government after independence perpetuated a political culture of patrimony. Paul Richards, in his analysis of Sierra Leone describes this phenomenon as follows:

“Patrimonialism involves redistributing national resources as marks of personal favour to followers who respond with loyalty to the leader rather than to the institution the leader represents...In patrimonial systems of government ‘big persons’ at the apex of

political power compete to command some share of the ‘national cake’ which they then redistribute through their own networks of followers.”¹⁹

In Angola, the long arm of patrimonial favouritism with its many fingers has been sustained both in the current government and in the rebel forces. Through the manipulation of the masses under the guise of Marxist-socialism, as well as through the ‘kick-backs’ from the buying and selling of the rich mineral resources of the country, a small percentage of the nation has benefited – namely the political elite and their extended families.

2. Ideological Leftovers – Orphans of the Cold War Era

“War in the post-Cold War world has changed. States have lost the monopoly of military violence once underwritten by nuclear balance of terror. The equipment is cheap, and widely available to religious, cultural and criminal organisations prepared to pursue armed conflict independently of sovereign states and without reference to international opinion.”²⁰

There remains a considerable debate around the effects of the Cold War era and its connections to the current state of affairs in global conflict. Some voices in the field have expressed concern that too much emphasis has been placed on the effects of a ‘Cold War’ frame of reference and the influence of former ‘Superpowers’ in contemporary conflicts. It is rarely disputed that the Cold War had huge implications on global conflict at its height, however, it is debated as to how much structural and ideological ‘residue’ remains from this era that still effects international conflicts today.

There are two points of interest that need to be considered in this discussion. Firstly, there is little doubt that Angola became a classic example of a nation used as a pawn in the East-West battle of ideologies and power. The support of the Soviet Union and Cuba for MPLA and the United States and South Africa for UNITA most certainly contributed to the extension of this civil war during the Cold War era. However, by the same token, after the down-fall of the Cold War system, these very superpowers also used their status as outside authorities to try to bring an end to the Angolan war, but with dubious success. There are those who would argue that the global peace process was greatly enhanced by the joint pressure for peace agreements, from the former ‘Superpowers’ themselves. In Angola, this joint pressure succeeded in the withdrawal of Cuban troops but it did not succeed in ending the bitter civil strife. In the first place, one must always question the impartiality of any diplomatic intervention when the very nations that function in a role as mediators were at one time, or are still selling weapons to the conflicting parties. In the second place, it is clear that Angola’s conflict has long outlived the Cold War era. In the words of Fen Osler Hampson:

“...By withdrawing military support the superpowers made it more difficult for some of their clients to sustain a policy of armed struggle. But these same clients had other means of procuring arms, and the loss of superpower support was not by itself a sufficient condition to bring them to the peace table and to engage them in a serious process of peace building.”²¹

3. Hidden Monsters – Ego, Personality & Power-Sharing

Another popular explanation and one that certainly contributes to lively conversation, is the notion that in fact, it is the people and not the processes that stand in the way of peace. In essence, this argument pivots on the ‘SELF’ of the persons in power. It has to do with the individual leaders’ will, pride, arrogance, openness to compromise and his/her insatiable appetite for personal power. Negotiations and peace agreements are engaged in as a game – if the rules suite the selfish, personal interests of the person in power than they will play, but if they do not fancy the rules, they won’t play.

Many books have been dedicated to diagnosing these interpersonal dynamics within a particular diplomatic negotiation effort. For example, Paul Hare, a seasoned US diplomat, in his book entitled, *“Angola’s Last Best Chance for Peace”* carefully outlines his experience and involvement in the most recent peace accords in Angola (Lusaka Protocol – 1994).²² Hare discusses how many important peace meetings, venues, and public appearances were thwarted

by the absence of one or both of the conflicting party heads. He painstakingly moves through the efforts to help one leader or the other to 'save-face' or to personally compromise on some issue. Hare speaks with frustration about all the energy put into trying to find a place of status, acceptable to Savimbi, in the current government, but to no avail.

This book makes interesting reading for the student of negotiation and diplomacy, but without any other reference to draw from, one could easily assume that the entire Angolan Peace Process hinged on two very strong personality types – Jose Dos Santos, (current President of Angola) and Jonas Savimbi (Leader of the Rebel Movement). Granted, these two powerful figures do play a very prominent role in the peace process, but there is growing conviction that peace in Angola will eventually have to come from the middle and bottom-up. Although Hare delves into the role and function of the UN in the peace-keeping process, only twice in the entire book is reference made to the correlation of this high level peace effort as it translates on the ground in the day-to-day affairs of the masses, the Church, and civil society as a whole.

4. Denial Diplomacy – Failed Negotiation & Mediation Interventions

“A settlement is an imperfect road map to the future.” (Fen Osler Hampson) ²³

On the other side of the 'ego-personality' proponents, stand the 'process-content' advocates. This school of thinking espouses to the principle that more than any other element, success and failure are actually dependent on the process used and the content unearthed in negotiation and mediation endeavours. At times the attention is so transfixed on clinching an agreement in a very short period of time that the final settlement is in fact shallow, short-sighted and does not address the deep-roots of the conflict. This is what some have termed “denial diplomacy.” Again, in the political and state diplomatic sectors, volumes of work have been written on negotiation and mediation techniques, and the success and failures of the crafting and implementation of peace agreements. While this detailed exploration is useful to a degree, it falls short of much of the collective social, psychological and spiritual forces that pulsate with change through a peace movement - as seen for instance in the Philippines' 'people's power' movement that has non-violently ousted two subsequent heads of state (Marcos and Estrada). This sort of serendipity is not rationally explained. It is intuitive and outside the parameters of the egos, personalities and abilities of heads of state, diplomatic mediators and other rational actors in the peace process.

Nonetheless, the place of the peace settlement / accords in the entire peace process is critical. According to Hampson there are at least three major hypotheses that are used to explain the success or failure of a given peace agreement:

- **The 'Ripeness' theory and/or other fundamental dynamics of conflict itself – (e.g. timing)**
- **The external pressures and influences exerted on the conflict by regional and international players.**
- **The focus of the content and substance of the provisions in the peace accords themselves. ²⁴**

From Hampson's own case study work and other research results today, there are generally four requirements for a peace settlement to be solid and long lasting:

- **It is essential that all warring parties have a seat at the negotiating table.**
- **It must contain 'power-sharing' provisions for winners/losers in the aftermath of elections.**
- **At minimum, it must level the playing field and allow equal and fair access to the political process by formerly excluded groups.**
- **It should have provision for third party mediation and re-negotiation during the implementation phase of the settlement.**

When perusing through the seeming failures of Angola's peace agreements it would be important to note that all of the three major settlements built upon and learnt from the previous one, however, each of these accords had an essential weakness that was not previously predicted. The Gbadolite negotiations failed because there was no formal written

accord produced at the close of the negotiations and thus, the substance of the agreements were left to interpretations of the individual parties. Learning from the Gbadolite experience, the Bicesse Accords were much more carefully constructed and were grafted and printed for signing. They were clear, specific, realistic and manageable. However, the monitoring and implementation phase of the agreement was not detailed or well spelled out and the results were disastrous. Hampson notes that settlements not only fail because of ambiguity, but also because of inflexibility and restrictive provisions. He quotes from the work of author Holsti who maintains that all peace agreements must, *“include procedures and institutions for identifying, monitoring, managing, and resolving major conflicts”*²⁶ as they arise after the formal accord has been signed.

Finally, in the Lusaka Protocol, (which was by far the strongest of the agreements both in substance and in implementation plans) the Angolan peace horizon looked closer than ever. However, as the monitoring of the implementation proceeded it became exceedingly clear that for some reason, beyond comprehension, the parties were still not fully committed to the peace process. The implementation effort was stretched over 4 years (up to 1998) and was still not complete when the mediator and key person involved in the agreement and its implementation, Mr. Alioune Blondin Beye, was killed in a aeroplane accident. One must ask why is the peace of Angola still waning? Why does it still remain so illusive? This is where one must stretch beyond the traditional, the comfortable and the known explanations and search for new dimensions for peace.

5. “Diamonds are Forever” – The Greedy Clamouring for Resources

*“Angola’s paradox is that it is awash in oil, but mired in poverty.” (Jon Jeter, Journalist)*²⁷

No discussion on peace in Angola would be complete without touching on the controversial issue of mineral and oil resources. Angola is potentially one of the richest nations in the world when it comes to natural resources. **Angola daily produces nearly 800,000 barrels of crude oil – even more than Kuwait.** Only six other countries in the world produce more petroleum than Angola. Last year alone, it is estimated that international petroleum companies paid Angola about US\$ 900 million in exploration rights fees. A huge question mark hangs over this US\$ 900 million as the government has yet to account for it. It seems that at least half of it has been spent on a military offensive aimed at driving UNITA out of the country, but the other half, considered by the government as “bonuses”, has not been published in the official national budget.²⁸

What is clear is that nearly three-quarters of the nation’s population are desperately poor. The war has claimed at least 500,000 lives, life expectancy is 42 years of age, one-third of all children die before the age of five from eradicable diseases such as tuberculosis, polio and measles, and more than half of children who reach adulthood are illiterate (70% of the total population). **In 1998, the Angolan government spent more money on cars for cabinet ministers, legislators and their wives, than on the health and education budget for its entire population.** The government leaders and officials spend more than a third of their minuscule education budget on scholarships for relatives to study abroad.²⁹ This whole situation of corruption and lack of accountability is not only hard to believe, it is shamefully immoral and unethical. This abuse of natural mineral and oil resources on the part of all stakeholders in the Angolan conflict, is one of the most plausible explanations as to how this civil war could be sustained for more than a quarter of a century.

What can be done about this horrific situation? One positive move in the right direction appears to be the UN’s sanctions against UNITA. This includes sanctions on what are often called, “conflict diamonds”, as the rebels have

traditionally established their strongholds in the mining areas of the country. Paul Heinbecker, UN Security Council's Angola Sanctions Committee Chairman, is quoted as saying that these sanctions are "*beginning to have an impact.*" Heinbecker attributed the "*welcome situation*" to "*co-operation between governments, industry, civil society, and the United Nations and other international bodies.*"³⁰ Apparently, the increasing domestic and international pressure being put on Angola is paying off. In August of 2000, the government offered amnesty for rebel soldiers if they would comply with the 1994 Lusaka cease-fire agreement. Dos Santos' government also announced an approximately US\$ 300 million programme of economic and infrastructure improvements.³¹ **For Angola, justice and peace are inextricably bound together.**

6. Civil Society Collapse – A Battle-Worn, Apathetic Civilian Will?

"I think there's a transformation taking place." (Imaculada Melo, Exec. Director of the Angolan Civic Association)³²

The Angolan people have often been accused or blamed for "allowing" the civil war to go on as long as it has. In part this is true, to the degree that the common folk are just plain battle weary, struggling to survive from one day to the next, and so severely traumatised that people live in a state of perpetual 'numbness.' For a very long time the civilian population has looked to the government to solve their problems, they have not been well organised for mobilisation, and even to this day most dissenting voices within civil society have been intimidated, threatened or imprisoned by the government. In my recent visit to Angola (Oct. 2000), when interviewed by the media I was counselled by my host to talk about "peace" but not to "criticise" the government. Angolan Journalist Rafael Marques was jailed and convicted of defamation for an article he wrote in 1999 referring to president Dos Santos as a dictator. But Angola is turning a corner – there is a ground swell of "voices for peace" being heard throughout the land. I believe there is a 'critical mass' of people who are saying enough is enough, who are counting the costs and are willing to make the necessary sacrifices in order to see non-violent change occur in their country. As Jon Jeter reports:

*"Marques' arrest, and the police's brutal treatment of people who assembled in Luanda earlier this year to protest the government's 1,700 % increase in gasoline prices, apparently have widened the dissent within a war-weary population that had previously been reluctant to challenge its brutally oppressive government."*³³

When I visited Angola in 1995, I was hosted by one of the only Angolan NGO's in the country. At that time it was clear that the international NGOs were in fact acting as surrogate civil society in Angola and many people expressed fear of a total civil society collapse once these international NGOs moved out. Upon my return in 2000, I was very impressed with what seemed to be a growing and active civil society. Indeed, the interest in the training workshop I was involved with on "Non-violent Social Action among the Church and Civil Society" was telling. Independent of this training, but concurrent with it, was an event in which thousands of women were organised to march on the capital in protest, for peace and against the violence - both in the war and on the domestic front. In a first-ever opinion poll conducted by the government owned newspaper, Journal de Angola, 600 people were interviewed in Luanda. Of that group 73% said they didn't know whether or not they loved their country. Only 9% said they were very patriotic and 12% answered that Angolans as a whole were not very patriotic. When asked about their politicians, most indicated that they viewed their political leaders as the least patriotic of all Angolans, followed closely by the business profession.³⁴ This sort of opinion poll indicates a number of important steps in the right direction. First, by the very fact that this opinion poll was sponsored and conducted by a newspaper known to be the propaganda arm of the government, is amazing.

Second, the fact that people were willing to speak their minds and admit their own lack of patriotism is an interesting

advancement. Third, the fact that people openly criticised the perceived lack of patriotism on the part of their leaders and business people is a sign that people and civil society are beginning to exert their will.

Within the Church, concern for peace is also building up strong momentum. In April 2000, an umbrella peace movement was launched called COIEPA, under the able leadership of Rev. Ntoni Ntzinga. COIPA is working to bring together Catholic and Protestant as well as Religious and Political leadership to promote a broad-based peace dialogue. In the AGM of the Angolan Council of Churches in October 2000, there was considerable and heated debate about whether or not the Council of Churches should respond positively to an invitation by the government to attend and lead a prayer at the official Independence Celebrations. Some were saying ‘yes’ it is our duty to pray for our government, others were saying ‘no’ we must tell the government that if they want our prayer support they must first enter into peace negotiations. The largest Protestant denomination in Angola, IECA (Evangelical Congregational Church in Angola) has been taking a ‘prophetic’ stance for peace for many years now. In August of 2000, IECA’s Youth Desk hosted a national youth convention where a set of bold final resolutions were published challenging the government in issues of illiteracy, AIDS, unemployment, violence, war and globalisation. They called for 1.) The promotion of a culture of peace and good relationships, for the creation of new social standards and human dignity, 2.) For new laws and policies to enhance public order and to deal effectively with juvenile delinquency, corruption and nepotism, and 3.) For improved social communications based on truth, transparency, freedom of speech, and independent journalism.³⁵ Contrary to those who would want to try to extinguish the flame of hope, I believe that the pulsating rhythm for peace is being felt and translated into a strategic, concerted and unified people’s movement for the transformation of Angola.

III. Peace-Scaffolding – A Matrix for the Future

A. Recognising the Form – Giving Shape to Peace

Building a frame for peace in Angola has been like the process of setting out on a journey but needing to wait for the early morning fog and mist to lift, in order to be able to see the path, the obstacles and the horizon ahead. As we turn our attention to the signposts for peace in Angola, we will first need to review the “river” of thought and practice that lends itself to ‘conflict transformation’ as a field. What are some of the tributaries that feed this river of peace that I speak of?

Tributary One: Origins of Peace - Firstly, it must be noted that for some people and cultures peace is not a moral objective or an end goal. Among many cultures, violent conflict and war are viewed very organically – a natural part of the communal cycle of life and death. Peace was not always desirable or possible when, for instance, to not go to war resulted in “sin” (holy war concept), produced “dishonour” (face-saving value) or when long term peace was considered a “social evil” (leading to laziness, undisciplined character, internal factionalism and disunity in a society). According to Edward N. Luttwak, the concepts of war and peace, their practices, rules and limitations have roots in the European Enlightenment period. Influenced heavily by evolutionary theory, the intellectuals of the Enlightenment period began to reject the idea that humankind has a base instinct towards violence and instead they espoused the idea that humankind is on an evolutionary learning curve that will one day bring them to an existence of idyllic peace. This was the birthing cot for modern notions of peace through deterrence, appeasement, or diplomacy.³⁶ In my opinion, Luttwak has made a very Western, Euro-centric analysis of the origins of war and peace. He has disregarded a wealth of knowledge about other ancient civilisations (Oriental Asian, Polynesian, African, Middle Eastern and Indian) that had

effective mechanisms to limit war and violence and elaborate rituals to make lasting covenants of peace. These ancient cultural practices can and should also significantly inform our efforts at peace today.

Tributary Two: The Behaviourist View – The behaviourist school of thought on international relations, arose in response to the ‘realist’ rationality of the enlightenment approach to peace and diplomacy. The Behaviourist view has helped shape much of what is termed the ‘constructionist’ lens of peace building practice. This notion looks at violence and war as resulting from power imbalance and ‘functional regularities’ in the way nations are organised and structured. The proponents of this school of thought believe that these functional regularities can be rigorously quantified and categorised to predict conflict more accurately as well as in formulating more appropriate responses. Central to this ‘behaviouralist-structuralist’ approach is the idea that national power is rooted in the relationship between three master variables: 1.) Population, 2.) Technology and 3.) Natural Resources. (A very materialist paradigm indeed!) Out of this movement, three basic models for developing ‘workable peace’ have been advanced. These are:

- ❖ **Pragmatic Strategy** – aimed at intervening on the margins of a conflict in an effort to de-escalate hostilities and bring about negotiations.
- ❖ **Rule-Seeking Strategy** – aimed at clarifying the rules of intervention along the lines of international law.
- ❖ **Preventative Strategy** – aimed at getting at the root causes / perceptions of conflict and changing them.³⁷

Tributary Three: Multi-Track Diplomacy – Moving the whole debate on war and peace from the diplomatic-state level to other sectors of society is often referred to as track-two diplomacy. Dr. Louise Diamond and Ambassador John McDonald have expanded on this track-two notion in their book on **“Multi-Track Diplomacy”** where they make a very strong case for understanding peace building from a highly systemic and multi-sectoral perspective. These authors identify nine tracks that must be monitored and co-ordinated:

Track:	Purpose:	Function:
1. Government	Peacemaking through Diplomacy	Command Function
2. Non-governmental / Professional	Peacemaking through Professional Conflict Resolution	Regulating Function
3. Business	Peacemaking through Commerce	Exchange Function
4. Private Citizen	Peacemaking through Personal Involvement	Alternative Power Source Function
5. Research, Training, and Education	Peacemaking through Learning	The Brain of the System
6. Activism	Peacemaking through Advocacy	The Fight Leader of the System
7. Religion	Peacemaking through Faith in Action	The Heart of the System
8. Funding	Peacemaking through Providing Resources	The Financial Battery of the System
9. Communications & the Media	Peacemaking through Information	Information & Communication function of the System

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Diamond and McDonald give five reasons to justify the need for this sort of comprehensive approach. These are: 1.) Evolving political systems, 2.) Regional identity-group conflicts, 3.) Changing views of power and violence, 4.) Globalisation of world economy, and 5.) Environmental sustainability.³⁹ All of these issues except for number two, impinge on the conflict as in unfolds in Angola. Likewise, all of these same issues, if harnessed for good, will need to be part of the recipe for peace in that nation.

Tributary Four: Humanitarian Aid & Conflict – The effect of co-ordinated global humanitarian aid, and its exponential growth in the past decades, has to be seriously considered in any plan for peace. This is especially important and of urgent priority as humanitarian aid does not occur within a vacuum – it is most often intimately linked with war zones and the displacement of people resulting from violence. Mary Anderson in her book, *“Do No Harm”* lays out a simple but sensible framework in which one can analyse the impact of aid on conflict and the interaction between the two. Anderson speaks to the primary need for the aid organisation to know the scope of its mandate, funding / resource base and have a clear, effectively working organisational structure / system in place. Following these initial criteria, the aid organisation must ask two sets of questions: 1.) What are the tensions/dividers and capacities for war in the context in which we are working, and 2.) What are the connectors/local capacities for peace in the context in which we are working? Within both of these questions are sub-questions related to whether or not the conflict has a deep-rooted, historical base or is it proximate and new, is it broad or narrow, is it external or internal and is it actual or potential? Simultaneously, while asking these questions, the aid organisation must always be reflecting and reconfiguring its work according to the implicit ethical messages being sent to the local context where resource transfers are occurring.⁴⁰

John Prendergrast, in his published work on humanitarian aid, entitled, *“Front-line Diplomacy”*, outlines what he believes are the ‘ten commandments’ for providing aid without sustaining conflict:

- ❑ **Deepen analysis in planning and diversify information sources.**
- ❑ **Asses needs properly and independently.**
- ❑ **Study options for modalities of access.**
- ❑ **Be astute and flexible in the types of aid provided.**
- ❑ **Study impacts of targeting and distribution methods.**
- ❑ **Standardise costs and minimise extortion and hyperinflation.**
- ❑ **Commit to independent monitoring and evaluation.**
- ❑ **Integrate human rights monitoring, advocacy and capacity building objectives.**
- ❑ **Co-ordinate at all levels.**
- ❑ **Prioritise engagement and capacity building.**⁴¹

Similarly, authors’ Minear and Weiss suggest eight guiding principles for humanitarian aid: 1.) Relieving the life-threatening suffering, 2.) Proportionality, 3.) Non-partisanship, 4.) Independence, 5.) Accountability, 6.) Appropriateness, 7.) Discerning the Context, and 8.) Keeping Sovereignty in its proper place.⁴² The tensions and abuses inherent in the interaction between aid and conflict present a number of hurdles that stand in the progress of peace. Minear and Weiss open one of the chapters in their book describing these difficulties:

“Armed conflicts present humanitarian actors with seven common challenges: assessing the severity of a particular crisis, negotiating access to affected populations, mobilising human and financial resources, delivering services, ensuring co-ordination, pursuing education and advocacy activities, and looking beyond the emergency.”⁴³

Expanding on the suggestion that humanitarian aid actors ‘look beyond the emergency’, these authors indicate that it is firstly, very important for aid workers to begin to anticipate and plan for possible negative or increased conflict as a result of their aid efforts. Secondly, that within the seemingly negative outcomes there may be hidden potential positive ‘spin-offs’ that must be augmented in the pursuit of peace. Thirdly, that an essential safeguard and critical opportunity for enhanced peace building can be seized upon if the humanitarian aid projects use the indispensable resource of local people who have been affected by the crisis.⁴⁴

The salient point in this section is the fact that current aid literature is now beginning to reflect a serious interchange between the fields of conflict transformation and material aid. In the past, these connections have often been ignored under the guise of keeping clear and separate mandates. In this new era of global networking, mass communications and systems integration, these kinds of interwoven linkages are becoming increasingly vital in the pursuit of peacemaking. Any conflict transformation framework that fails to fit the “aid” piece into the scheme of the whole puzzle will miss a pivotal part of the picture.

Tributary Five: African Configurations for Peace –African author and statesman, B.A. Kiplagat, suggests at least five political and institutional conditions for peace in Africa. These are:

- **Observation of basic principles of democracy**
- **Integration of time-tested, historical traditions of ‘African contextual democracy.’**
- **Honouring of human rights and administration of justice.**
- **Upholding the ‘Rule of Law’ – the cornerstone to conflict prevention.**
- **Encouraging a strong, independent civil society.**⁴⁵

Due to the conflictual complications (e.g. military coups, dictatorships, civil strife, assassinations, etc.) that have often accompanied the sudden enforcement of liberal democratic rule in Africa’s transition, Ali Mazrui, African author and academic, proposes seven practical possible political solutions for some of Africa’s most conflict-ridden situations. These are as follows:

- ◆ **No party system (ex. President Museveni and Uganda)**
- ◆ **No party president and multi-party parliament**
- ◆ **Federalism (ex. Nigeria)**
- ◆ **Power-sharing arrangement between military and civilians, what the author calls ‘diarchy’ or dual sovereignty (ex. Nigeria in 1972)**
- ◆ **Power-sharing arrangement between military and civilians, through random or planned alterations between elections and military regimes (this is already occurring in a number of African countries anyway – Burundi, Ivory Coast, DRC, to name a few)**
- ◆ **Power-sharing arrangements between military and civilians, through constitutional outline – set up a Bicameral legislature with a ‘Civic House’ for civilian representatives and a ‘Service House’ for military representatives.**
- ◆ **Power-sharing arrangement in presidency with alternative civilian presidents with military vice presidents and visa versa**⁴⁶

Mazrui makes it clear in no uncertain terms that the above-mentioned configurations should only be seen as transitional (at the most for a generation - 40 years), at which time a graduation to *‘undiluted civilian supremacy in a viable democracy’* should be the stated end goal and target. According to Mazrui, there are at least eight current, as well as future scenarios for African conflict resolution interventions. Obviously, some of these options are more desirable (constructive and conducive to lasting peace) than others. These scenarios extrapolate as follows:

- **Restoration of order through a unilateral intervention by a single neighbouring power**
- **Intervention by a single power with the blessing of a legitimate regional organisation**
- **Inter-African colonisation or annexation (ex. Tanzania and Zanzibar)**
- **Regional integration with larger, stronger and more stable states (this has been proposed on occasion – Rwanda and Tanzania or Lesotho and South Africa)**
- **An African Security Council be established – modelled after UN structure with a set number of permanent members.**
- **A pan-African emergency force be established**
- **A High Commission for Refugees and Displaced persons be established under the auspices of the OAU (Organisation of African Unity)**
- **An Ad-Hoc mechanism for conflict resolution be established to engage in mediation, negotiation, arbitration and conciliation interventions.**⁴⁷

In March of 2000, I was present at a USAID symposium on Democracy held in Zambia. Considerable debate was stirred up in this symposium when the US presenter indicated that there is only one kind of democracy – there cannot be different forms of democracy. He posited that just as there are universal human rights that supersede all different cultures, so it is with democracy. The point of his emphasis was to try to debunk the concept of “African democracy” and thereby convince those in the audience that US democracy is the best form of government. I was quite naturally horrified at the direction this presentation was taking. In my mind, what I felt had to be confronted in this argument was the very fact that there are a great spectrum of democratic governments all throughout the eastern as well as western hemispheres. Namely, the social democracy instituted in Sweden is very different from the democracy experienced in the US or for that matter the mass-based peoples democracy that is playing itself out in the Philippines or South Africa is quite extraordinary from what is understood as democracy in Canada. Therefore, in my opinion, regardless of one’s political bent or bias, Africa should be encouraged to explore and travel down new avenues of political re-structuring and reform – affording it the full opportunity to discover it’s own forms of democracy.

B. Constructing a Prototype: Three Interacting Elements

“The longest journey begins with a single step, and the single step commences by facing in the right direction.”
(Chief Buthelezi, Inkatha Freedom Party, South Africa) ⁴⁸

There are many paths of peace to choose from – choosing the most rigorous, most constructive roads, and advancing on them is the greatest challenge faced today. The options to choose from in almost any area of life in the 21st Century have multiplied exponentially and are infinitely more complex than ever before in history. Why is this so? Author Robert Pickus expounds on three major world influences that have impacted on the peace field. These are: 1.) The awakening to the realisation of world interdependence, 2.) The mushrooming numbers and influence of trans-national NGO entities, and 3.) The rise and demand of qualitative change as a sign of global progress. A variety of creative and transformative initiatives have flowed out of the backdrop of these three influences. Global programmes of relations and information exchange, pre-collegiate curricula for peace education, and religious-based peace activities, to name just a few of these efforts, are now criss-crossing and cross-pollinating all over the international landscape. ⁴⁹ In order to focus this discussion more carefully, I would like to concentrate on three strands that I believe must be woven together in order to sustain a lasting peace.

1. Preventative Foresight

Prevention is a word that is highly over-used, gravely under-developed, and not always understood. What is conflict prevention? The spectrum of definitions is very wide in meaning ; from that which keeps societies from going to war, to solving conflicts through non-violent actions and dialogue (such as negotiations and mediation), to working to change attitudes that give cause to destructive and violent tendencies. Cautioning against too broad a definition, Michael Lund, in his comprehensive book on *“Preventing Violent Conflicts”*, defines preventative diplomacy as:

“Action taken in vulnerable places and times to avoid the threat or use of armed force and related forms of coercion by states or groups to settle the political disputes that can arise from the destabilising effects of economic, social, political, and international change.” ⁵⁰

Lund differentiates between peacetime diplomacy, which is employed when there is a ‘stable peace’, preventative diplomacy, which is engaged in times of ‘unstable peace’, and crisis diplomacy, which is enacted when under conditions of outright war, confrontation and violent aggression. He identifies three sub-categories of preventative diplomacy. These are:

1.) Crisis Prevention:	To block violent acts and reduce tensions
2.) Pre-emptive Engagement:	To address specific disputes, channel grievances into negotiations and engage parties.
3.) Pre-conflict Peace Building:	To create channels for dispute resolution, build political institutions, define norms, change attitudes, and reduce sources of conflict.

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In regards to policy-making and implementation, Lund suggests that there are five key issues that must be taken into consideration; 1.) Early warning, 2.) Deciding priorities, 3.) Devising effective interventions, 4.) Mobilising will and resources, and 5.) Linking international actors in a coherent system.⁵² All of these five components are elemental to the struggle for peace in Africa. Although the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) has an early warning prevention mechanism, its effectiveness is in serious question. Most early warning reflection and response action in Africa is being done by regional structures and/or regional NGO networks. African diplomat and writer, B. A. Kiplagat, outlines seven African early warning signals:

- ✓ **Refusal of country to permit refugees to return home**
- ✓ **Large numbers of citizens fleeing a state – especially prominent leaders, intellectuals and politicians**
- ✓ **Growth in number of internally displaced persons**
- ✓ **Significant growth in security budget, structural changes and increased recruitment into all branches of the security forces (military, police, etc.)**
- ✓ **When ‘security zones’ are declared out of bounds for foreigners**
- ✓ **Government recruitment of lobbyists to burnish it’s tarnished image in western capitals**
- ✓ **Significant increase in size of prison population especially of so-called ‘political or quasi-political prisoners’⁵³**

Even when these sort of early warning lights are flashing, one finds that the regional structures are often encumbered with bureaucracy and politics that hinder efficient decision-making and prioritisation. When intervention is taken it is often done so unilaterally and the use of military force is the first mode of operation. Unfortunately, the ‘will’ and ‘resources’ for mobilisation are often motivated by selfish economic interests and gain. Finally, all of this has led to a desertion by international players who could partner with Africa to create a more comprehensive system of prevention.

To this end, Michael Lund proposes what he terms, “**Organising a Preventive Regime**”, in response to the current efforts at prevention, which he describes as ‘fragmented, patchy and uncoordinated.’ Lund makes it very clear that this preventive regime is not a ‘one world order’ idea, but instead “*a set of norms and procedures that is explicitly multilateral and multilevel.*” This system would be UN-centred with regional organisations as hubs, NGO networks functioning as prevention mechanisms, and individual states having a significant voice at all levels. Lund explains that this system would be ‘stratified’ with vertical and horizontal organisational differentiation. It would entail a vertical hierarchy – local, regional, and global, but horizontally its operation would be decentralised, functioning on an axis of graduated responses and lateral collaboration. The basic elements of the operating strategy of such a system are delineated as follows:

- ◆ **Proactive monitoring of and early response to pre-violent or low levels of conflict;**
- ◆ **Preventive action to ensure interstate and internal political disputes are settled without the use of force;**
- ◆ **A ground-up policy perspective that focuses resources and attention on the needs of especially troubled areas;**

- ◆ Assertion of the normative primacy of the peaceful transformation of societies and governments undergoing destabilising change;
- ◆ Local and subregional actors authorised and enabled to act as the first line of prevention;
- ◆ Coherent local conflict strategies;
- ◆ A graduated sequence of contingent responses based on the intensity level of conflicts and the power of the antagonists;
- ◆ When necessary, higher-level, more coercive responses by major powers and other global actors;
- ◆ Multilateral co-operation and co-ordination at all levels led by prime movers such as major powers; and
- ◆ Public-private partnership between official bodies and NGO's. ⁵⁴

2. Christian Ethical & Moral Vision

Peace Building devoid of ethical and moral fibre is invariably found to be hollow – lacking in substance and easily ‘collapse-able.’ There is a Christian, faith-based movement currently being given shape and form which espouses to what is called, “Just Peacemaking.” The voices that are defining this paradigm are Biblically-centred, and very intentional in their action to promote ‘transforming initiatives that link justice and peace.’ This emerging model is characterised as a ‘third-way’ - a turning beyond the ‘either-or’ polarisation that dominates current debates between pacifism and just war theories. Pacifism tends to lean towards a “do nothing” attitude and the just war theorists assume that war is the only other alternative. Just Peacemaking is an attempt at putting together an action-oriented framework in which one can practically DO peace. As a world-view, it is based on four prominent tenants: 1.) Biblical ‘concreteness’ and the Lordship of Jesus Christ, 2.) Grounding in realistic experience, 3.) Believes in the power of non-violence, and 4.) Endorses the importance of universal human rights. ⁵⁵

Glen Stassen, in his book entitled, “Just Peacemaking” lays out seven steps for just peacemaking. These seven steps have deep roots in the teachings of Jesus Christ (Sermon on the Mount), and the New Testament (Pauline Epistles and Romans). The Seven steps are both explicitly a Christian ethic as well as useful for application as a ‘Public Ethic.’ Stassen believes a public ethic (based on a Biblical framework and supported by reason and practical experience) is crucial for the moral discourse on peace in a pluralistic society – which involves a variety of faiths, cultures and ethnic groupings. What would this look like? Stassen offers the following breakdown:

Chart - Seven Steps of Just Peacemaking:

1. Affirm Common Security	Affirm our common security partnership with our adversaries and build an order of peace and justice that affirms their and our valid interests.
2. Take Independent Initiatives	Need for a new strategy of independent initiatives, directed toward transforming the reaction of the Enemy.
3. Talk with Your Enemy	Seek negotiations, using methods of CR.
4. Seek Human Rights and Justice	Seek HR and justice for all, especially the powerless, without double standards.
5. Acknowledge Vicious Cycles: Participate in Peacemaking Process	Need for realistic acknowledgement of vicious cycles we are caught up in, and our need to participate in realistic peacemaking process.
6. End Judgmental Propaganda, Make Amends	Instead of judgmental propaganda we can acknowledge to others that we have caused hurt and want to take actions to do better.
7. Work with Citizens' Groups for the Truth	To participate in groups with accurate information and a voice in policy-making.

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Stassen and others have translated this Just Peacemaking idea into ten practices for abolishing war:

❖ Support non-violent direct action;

- ❖ Take independent initiatives to reduce threats of violence and war;
- ❖ Use co-operative conflict resolution techniques;
- ❖ Acknowledge responsibility for conflict and injustice and seek repentance and forgiveness;
- ❖ Advance democracy, human rights and religious liberty;
- ❖ Foster just and sustainable economic development;
- ❖ Work with emerging co-operative forces in the international system;
- ❖ Strengthen the UN and international efforts for co-operation and human rights;
- ❖ Reduce offensive weapons and weapons trade; and
- ❖ Encourage grassroots peacemaking and voluntary associations.⁵⁷

The pivotal point in the promotion of these principles is that they offer a unique and holistic outlook on peace. This paradigm when carefully unpacked and applied will link together personal spiritual conversion, social peace and justice, and political conflict transformation. In abstract and general terms, the definition of peace is often divided into three camps. First, there are those who say peace can only be realised in the condition of the individual's heart – a spiritual tranquillity with God. Second, there are those who speak of peace as only attained after structural justice, unity, compassion, and the fulfilment of human needs is satisfied. This is often called “positive peace.” Lastly, there are those who speak of peace as a realistic state involving the absence of war and the implementation of non-violent management of conflicts. This is often called “negative peace.”⁵⁸ Just Peacemaking is a comprehensive framework in the sense that it encompasses all three of these definitions of peace. Just Peacemaking infuses any peace building framework with the necessary moral and ethical foundation to in fact effect lasting change – genuine spiritual transformation and its outworking in everyday life and behaviour.

3. An Integrated Systems Framework

John Paul Lederach in his book entitled, “Building Peace”, offers an integrated systems framework for peace that makes critical linkages among many of the different facets discussed in this paper. Lederach connects analysis, prevention, human relational needs and structural justice together to form a scaffolding that unifies the various aspects of an ideal vision for peace with the practical reality of the mechanics needed to attain this peace. Lederach uses the term “Justpeace” to identify three gaps that exist in most efforts at peace building. Firstly, there is the interdependence gap. Secondly, there is the structural justice gap. Thirdly, there is the process-structure gap. The first two gaps mentioned here have already been touched upon in this paper. I would like to turn my attention to the third gap mentioned. According to Lederach:

“Peace is neither a process nor a structure. It is both...I use the metaphor of a river to illustrate this. A river is one of the phenomena the New Science call a process-structure. When you stand up to your knees in a river what you see, feel and hear is the dynamic flow of water. It rushes around your legs with force and power, changing like the essence of water itself to get around any obstacle put in its way. On the other hand if you stand high on the mountain, or position yourself at a window of an aeroplane and look down at the river from a long distance what you see is the shape and form it has carved in the land. From a distance it looks static. You see it as a structure not a dynamic process. This is a process-structure. A river is dynamic, adaptive and changing while at the same time carving a structure with direction and purpose.”⁵⁹

The key descriptive words here are ‘adaptive’ (a flexible process) and ‘purposeful’ (a driven structure). These are the concepts that under-gird Lederach’s integrated framework. Borrowing for systems theory, Lederach arranges this model along two axes. The vertical axis indicates the LEVEL of the conflict – Issue, Relationship, Sub-system, and System. The horizontal axis identifies the ACTIVITIES and TIMEFRAMES that correspond with the different levels of the conflict – Crisis Intervention, Preparation & Training, Design of Social Change, and Desired Future. If one were to place


these four activities along a “peace” spectrum, they might translate to peacekeeping (crisis intervention) – peacemaking (Preparation & Training) – peace building (Design of Social Change) and – peace sustaining (Desired Future). In the middle of the graph, Lederach has placed the various “voices of speciality” within the field according to where they are most likely to take an active role in peace building as it relates to their theoretical and practical orientation. These ‘actors’ often speak different languages and frustrate each other greatly, but they are in fact all very strategic players that each have very important roles to play in the grand design. **Co-ordinating these critical “voices” is one of the paramount challenges in the peace building process.** The questions that each of these different ‘camps’ are asking are all unique and valuable to the peace transformation process:

- **Crisis management** – How do we manage the immediate crisis?
- **Root Causes** – What are the root causes of the crisis?
- **Prevention** – How do we prevent the crisis from recurring?
- **Vision** – What are the social structures and relationships we desire?
- **Transformation** – How do we get from crisis to desired change?

The following is an adapted and synthesised version of Lederach’s integrated framework: ⁶⁰

Level of Response:

↑	Systemic: Global
	Sub-System: Regional/State
	Relationship: Inter-personal / Inter-group
	Issue: Local Symptoms



Crisis Intervention: Cessation of violence Humanitarian Aid	Preparation & Training: Educating / Mobilising the People	Design of Social Change: Institutional/Structural Transformation	Desired Future: A New Horizon / Vision
Peacekeeping Immediate Action (2-6 months)	Peacemaking Short-range Planning (1-2 years)	Peace Building Decade Thinking (5-10 years)	Peace Sustenance Generational Work (20+ years)

Time Frame of Activity →

III. Conclusion: A Reflective Model for Peace in Angola

When looking for peace in Angola there is the tendency to shake our heads in despair. The intent of this paper was to expand the possibilities for constructing peace in the most difficult of locations, like Angola. I have concentrated on three interacting elements that could make up a prototype for peace. In the first place, prevention strategies will have to be looked at carefully in Angola, if for no other reason than the fact that Angola has one of the longest running civil wars in Africa. Forward-looking prevention mechanisms will have to be the shielding wall that surrounds a peace process in Angola.

In the second place, I do not believe that peace will come to Angola without the Church's central role in "Just Peacemaking." The Church makes up the largest on-the-ground network of any organisation in Angolan civil society. The Church has at least eight distinct roles it can play with integrity.

- **Provocateur Role**
- **Voice for the Voiceless**
- **Mobilising of the Masses**
- **Intermediary Role**
- **Conduit for Dialogue**
- **Moral Voice for Truth and Reconciliation**
- **Peace Education**
- **A place for individual & collective spiritual conversion & transformation**⁶¹

Professor Duane Friesen gives voice to the Church's role in a five-level model of action. He suggests that the Church must take action through 1.) Shaping Ethos, 2.) Being an Example, 3.) Doing Service, 4.) Affecting Policy, and 5.) Permeating Vocations. Friesen unpacks these notions further:

1.) Ethos: Helping shape the character of society – The Church is one of the most important places where attitude change can occur

- **De-legitimate war by attitude change, support of non-violence and conflict resolution for a just society**
- **Peace Education - teach conflict resolution skills in church, family schools and media**

2.) Example: the Church must demonstrate justice and non-violence internally and externally – The most powerful witness often comes in the moment of 'responding in the opposite spirit' even when facing apparent defeat by the 'principalities and powers' of violence.

3.) Service: The Church must organise itself as an institution to meet human need.

- **Structures responsive to human needs of poverty, malnutrition, disease, and community disorganisation, and alternative criminal justice models.**
- **Agents of change - third-party interveners, activists, advocates, mediators, researchers and at times enforcers of agreements and decisions.**

3.) Policy: Influence public opinion and legislation.

- **Use of pressure politics and electoral politics, public pronouncements, and educating members.**

4.) Vocation: Working for peaceful change in other institutional settings of society.

- **Being an innovator - seeing peace as a life vocation to permeate all areas of individual and collective life.**⁶²

It is now time for the Church in Angola to see and think of itself as an actor in political affairs. Angola will be very hard pressed to come right without strong faith-based, moral and ethical leadership strategically situated across all sectors of society, that gives 'prophetic' voice to the truth in this complex, protracted conflict.

Finally, a very practical, integrated framework for peace building needs to be applied to Angola. In Angola, peace will have to go one step beyond being a co-ordinated, 'multi-track' effort. The multi-track idea provides for many different actors to be involved, but the very analogy of "tracks" insinuates many tracks moving forward towards a goal, in

parallel fashion, possibly without ever intersecting along the way. The Angolan peace process will need to make sense at all levels of society in order for it to ‘stick.’ If this is to happen, the peace process not only needs to move ahead in parallel track positions, but the various ‘tracks’ will have to also intersect and interact often, similar to the function of a ‘switch-track’ in the railroad image, or a woven braid. Peace at the national level will need to look and feel like peace at the local level, and visa versa. This will call for an intensive effort to orchestrate all the sectors and levels at which peace activities are happening, so that they actually “reflect” the desired messages of peace, and the values that reinforce those messages from ‘the top to the bottom’ of that society. If the switch-tracks are not functioning well or the switch-track operators is not alert or incapacitated, a serious train smash could occur. Angola has experienced enough ‘train smashes’ in its peace efforts – its time to work hard at avoiding derailment in the future.

One could also take the image of a reflective mirror. A person can hold a mirror in their hands, situate themselves in any part of a room and depending on the size of the mirror and how they tilt the mirror, they can see any other part of the room including the floor, ceiling, and walls. This ‘reflective model’ is how the peace process must also be experienced in Angola. Every Angolan must be able to get their hands on this thing called ‘peace’ and experience and understand it in a tangible personal as well as corporate way. What is useful and meaningful for peace in the governmental sector must be decoded and interpreted to make sense to the civilian on the street. Likewise, the symbolic or real peace endeavours that are being played out on the grass-roots level must be translated for, and appreciated by the government leaders who may be watching from afar. This mode of operation will require trust, ingenuity, patience and a very careful communication flow in design and implementation. The following chart is an outline of possible activities with the prescribed levels of intervention. It is an adaptation of Lederach’s work with in mind the kinds of activities that need to be co-ordinated in an integrated peace plan in a setting like Angola. Obviously, Angola will need to identify those applications that make the most sense in that context. However, I would dare to suggest that there are the appropriate actors and infrastructure even now in Angola for a peace transformation of this nature to occur.

FOCUS:	CRISIS	PEOPLE	INSTITUTIONS	VISIONS
	(Issues)	(Relationships)	(Systems)	(Generations)
TIME FRAME:	2-6 Months	1-2 Years	5-10 Years	20+ Years
Activities:	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Direct Intervening - Diagnostic Analysis - Observing/Monitoring - Relief Work - Short-term Immediate Measures 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Training - Identifying Change Agents - Capacity Building - Surfacing Empowering Resources - Team Building 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Developing Inter-sectoral Linkages - Broad Spectrum Peace Education - Violence Prediction - Dispute Resolution System Designs - Holistic Response Initiatives - Developing Infrastructure for 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Developing Forums for Future Imaging - Giving Voice to Peace Dream-Keepers - Maximising Resonance with Global Initiatives - Unleashing

	- Disarm, demobilise and de-mine	- Healing Efforts	Sustainability - Reconciliation Work - Structural Change (political, economic & social)	Transforming Arts, Media & Culture Capacity - Engaging in Symbolic Activities
PROCESS:	Peace Keeping	Peace Making	Peace Building	Peace Sustaining

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The obvious question is, how could this happen? It would be impossible to structurally or bureaucratically set this type of comprehensive peace structure up. However, with the right combination of actors from all sectors of society, who trust each other and who share a common vision, purpose and the necessary back-up support, this could be a reality. In stages one and two, one would find international NGO's (such as the UN, Red Cross, Caritas, World Vision, Christian Aid, Christian Children's Fund, etc.) to be most useful. However, also in stage one and particularly in stage two one should see the local NGO's and Churches taking on more and more of a lead. In Angola this would involve entities like the Council of Churches, Development Workshop, Search for Common Ground, and COIEPA – a Church-based network that has strategically placed itself across all the different sectors of society – government, NGO and the people on the ground. COIEPA has a three-prong strategy of providing provincial forums for dialogue between the Churches as well as between Church and government leaders. At the same time they are organising mass 'peace celebrations' among the grassroots public in each province. In stages three and four a strong partnership would need to arise between civil society and the government in Angola – with appropriate support from international players.

When speaking of this 'integrated systems framework' one could also borrow an illustration from the world of technology; it would be like the difference between using a cable cord as opposed to using an 'infra-red' system for communication between my computer and printer. A cable cord is more restrictive and cumbersome, where as with 'infra-red' the communication occurs through electrical currents and airwaves and it completely free of the structural hindrances as represented by the cord. A truly effective, integrated peace framework in Angola does not need more material/physical structure, it needs a higher level of communication, collaboration and synergy that has to do with spirit and intuition not just material, reason and organisation. It calls forth a new generation of leaders who will move in 'spirit and in truth', who will be able to 'discern the times', and who will be able to link human relational potential with practical transformative activities that will create, inspire and uphold a vision for peace.

Endnotes:

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