Level II

Chapter 2
Reading

IC3

IC3 | IT | TOEFL | Best Answer
English | Vietnamese
Assessment

Water Ecology

Your life: does a river run through it?
Có dòng sông nào chảy qua cuôc đời của bạn không?

Skills:

In this chapter you will do these things:

English Language Skills:

1. Bias in Western Writing
2. Vocabulary: River and River Development
3. Sharpening Dictionary Skills
4. Recognizing Reading Structure
5. Scanning for Meaning
6. Appendix C: Reading Directions

Vietnamese Language Skills:

Vocabulary: River and River Development
Antonyms
Scanning for Meaning

IC3 Skills:

Bridges over Troubled Waters
Development Debate
Subjective and Objective Reporting

IT Skills:

Navigate “Google.com” for information on organizations
concerned with sustaining and regulating the Mekong.

Create a graphic organizer on the word processor to identify characteristics
and values of the chosen organization.
Save the organizer on your disk.

TOEFL Skills

Reading comprehension

Intercultural Communicative Competence

Back to Top

Bridges Over Troubled Waters and Lands: Present Imperfect, Future Uncertain

(Excerpts from Chapter 15, Mekong : Turbulent Past, Uncertain Future.
Milton Osborne, Atlantic Monthly Press, New York, 2000, pp. 248-252.)

There are few more telling reflections of the changes taking place along the Mekong than the bridges that have been constructed, or are currently being built, across its broad waters. These are not the first to be thrown across the Mekong. [S]ince the early centuries of the present era there has been a bridge, in fact several bridges across the river where its course runs through western Yunnan Province in China. Most were minor affairs, but the bridge that now spans the Mekong near the site of the Old Burma Road is the direct descendant of these earliest man-made crossing. And . . . the Chinese government built a bridge across the Mekong at Jinghong nearly forty years ago, in 1960. So bridges, in themselves, are not new. What is new is the scale of these new bridges and, most importantly, the fact that all but one of these bridges are on the Lower Mekong.

Until 1994, no bridges had ever been built across the lower mainstream course of the Mekong (with the exception of a Japanese-funded bridge across the Tonle Sap River at Phnom Penh which was destroyed in war in 1970). . . It was only in 1994 that a bridge was finally constructed across the Lower Mekong's mainstream. This was the so-called Friendship Bridge, funded by the Australian government, which links the northern Thai town of Nong Khai with the left, Lao, bank of the Mekong. . .

Since that time there has been an acceleration of plans and construction. The Australian government is funding another bridge at My Thuan in the Mekong Delta, while the Japanese government is paying for the construction of bridges at Komppong Cham, in Cambodia, and at Pakse, in Laos. Other bridges are either under consideration or set to be constructed at Can Tho in Vietnam, at Neak Luong, the main ferry crossing on the road between Phnom Penh and Ho Chi Minh City, at Savannakhet in Laos and between Chiang Khong in Thailand and Huay Xai in Laos. Meanwhile, further up the river at Jinghong, the Chinese have completed the construction of a massive suspension bridge that will ultimately facilitate the passage of heavy transport crossing the Mekong to travel down the expanding road system being directed towards Burma, Laos, and Thailand.

There is no doubt that this surge in bridge building will eventually have a major effect on the way in which goods move around southern China and through the countries of mainland Southeast Asia. Long delays at ferry crossings will be eliminated, so that it almost seems churlish to note that not all of the results of the construction that has taken place or is in process have automatically been viewed as positive in character. Take the case of the My Thuan Bridge across a major arm of the Mekong in southern Vietnam, which will be completed by the end of 2000. It is the biggest single aid project that has ever been funded by the Australian government, which is meeting two-thirds of the total outlay, at a cost of more than $39 million. When completed the bridge will be 1.5 kilometres long, with the main span 660 metres in length.

At present the expanse of water over which this bridge is being constructed is serviced by a fleet of vehicle ferries. Each day these ferries move more than twenty thousand people and some four thousand tones of freight. When I crossed over, in June 1998, no fewer than six ferries were shuttling backwards and forwards to service the busy route leading from Ho Chi Minh City down to the major delta centre of Can Tho. They presented an impressive sight, jockeying for position at the wharves on either side of the river, where shouting ferryhands directed, cajoled and bullied the never-ending mass of vehicles on and off the ferries. Cars, trucks and buses competed for places, along with innumerable bicycles and foot passengers. Somehow or other, order came out of apparent chaos. But though the ferries were remarkably effective, it was abundantly apparent that bridge would make this crossing easier and quicker. What I saw left me readily understanding why the Vietnamese government was so keen that Australia should make the construction of the My Thuan bridge its major aid contribution to Vietnam. And there is no doubt that greater ease of transportation will be important in allowing the delta's farmers and fishermen to ship perishable goods to Ho Chi Minh City more quickly and reliably.

And yet not everyone is convinced that the bridge is what is needed at My Thuan. Indeed, while the members of the present Australian government were in opposition before 1996, their spokesman on foreign affairs, Alexander Downer, the present Foreign Minister, was highly critical of the proposal to build the bridge, arguing that there were much better ways in which Australia could assist Vietnam than by committing virtually all of its available aid funds for Vietnam to this single project. He questioned the rationale of the then Australian Labor Party government that the bridge would be both a valuable contribution in itself and another opportunity to show, as had been done with the Friendship Bridge linking Thailand and Laos, that Australian companies had the skills to undertake major infrastructure projects. Rather, Alexander Downer suggested, money should be spent on many small-scale projects spread over a wider geographical region. This [too] was the view of Australian NGOs who queried the desirability of placing all, or virtually all, aid eggs in one basket. But perhaps most strikingly of all, the desirability of building a bridge was questioned by on of Vietnam's most respected academics and a former National Assembly member, the Vice-Rector of Can Tho University, Professor Vo Tong Xuan.

An agricultural expert who has not been afraid to offer views on Vietnam's economic development that do not always accord with those held by the leadership in Hanoi, Xuan's criticisms are the more persuasive because he acknowledges that the bridge will indeed bring some benefits. The problem, as he identifies it, is that there could be better ways of spending the large sums of money being committed to this single project. Xuan argues that more benefit would have flowed to the farmers of the Mekong Delta if a series of smaller bridges, capable of carrying vehicular traffic, had been constructed. These could have provided transport links between the villages of the region that currently depend on narrow footbridges across the creeks and canals that abound in the delta. If this had been done, Xuan has argued, it would have helped to stimulate regional development rather than promoting ever-greater use of the road leading to Ho Chi Minh City. Additionally, since transporting rice by truck rather than by boat to Ho Chi Minh City will be more expensive, and will add to the traffic congestion that already exists, Professor Xuan believes that a better choice would have been to spend Australian aid on improving port facilities in the delta itself. To do so would make it possible to ship exports abroad directly from the rice-producing region.

Ponder the Possibilities

Obviously, the bridge that this excerpt of reading is about has been built and chances are that you have used the bridge and recognize the convenience the bridge has brought to the Mekong Delta. For our purposes here, however, let us ponder the possibilities. The Australian government put $39 million into the construction of the bridge.

On a piece of paper, draw a line in the middle from top to bottom. On one half of the paper write the heading “Pros” and on the other half write the heading “Cons.” “Pros” means those things that are positive about building the bridge and “Cons” means those things that are negative about building the bridge. Then read quickly through this reading and make a list of the positive things on one side and the negative things on the other. You may also indicate which items are “pros” for Australia and which are “pros” for Vietnam. After you have included the pros and cons from the reading, add some pros and cons of your own.

More bridge building is underway or being contemplated in the Mekong Delta. Discuss in class what you think the priorities for development and waterways should be. Dr. Xuan makes some very persuasive arguments about the ports in the Delta. What do you think?

Bắc cầu qua vùng sông nước còn nhiều khó khăn: Hiện tại chưa hoàn hảo, tương lai còn mờ mịt.

(trích từ chương 15, “Đồng bằng sông Mê Kông: quá khứ hỗn loạn, tương lai mờ mịt. Milton Osborne, Atlantic Monthly Press, New York, 2000, trang 248-252.)

Còn nhiều điều cần nói đến khi đề cập đến sự phát triển vùng đồng bằng sông Cửu Long hơn là những cây cầu đã xây, hoặc hiện đang xây bắc qua dòng chảy rộng lớn của sông. Đây không phải là những chiếc cầu đầu tiên bắc qua sông Mê Kông. Từ những thiên niên kỉ đầu của kỉ nguyên đã có một chiếc cầu, đúng ra là nhiều chiếc cầu ở vùng sông chảy qua miền Tây tỉnh Vân Nam Trung Quốc. Phần lớn là cầu nhỏ, nhưng chiếc cầu hiện nay nối hai bờ sông đoạn gần Đường Miến Điện Cổ là hậu duệ trực tiếp của những cây cầu dựng bằng tay đó. Và … chính quyền Trung Quốc đã dựng một cây cầu qua sông Mê Kông đoạn chảy qua Kinh Hồnggần 40 năm trước đây, năm 1960. Vì vậy bản thân những cây cầu không có gì mới. Cái mới là độ lớn của những cây cầu hiện tại và quan trọng hơn nữa là tất cả đều được xây dựng ở hạ lưu sông Mê Kông.

Cho đến năm 1994, đoạn dưới sông Mê Kông không hề có cầu bắc qua ( trừ cây cầu do Nhật Bản tài trợ nối hai bờ sông Tông Lê Sáp ở Nông Pênh bị phá huỷ trong chiến tranh năm 1970) … Đến tận năm 1994 cuối cùng mới có một cây cầu bắc qua hạ lưu sông Mê Kông. Nó được gọi là cầu Hữu Nghị, do chính phủ Úc tài trợ, nối miền bắc của thành phố Nong Khai Thái Lan với tả ngạn sông Mê Kông thuộc địa phận nước Lào.

Từ đó tốc độ lập kế hoạch và xây đựng cầu được tăng nhanh. Chính phủ Úc tài trợ một cây cầu qua sông Mê Kông nữa ở Mỹ Thuận, trong khi chính phủ Nhật Bản cung cấp tài chính cho cây cầu ở Kông Pông Chàm, Cam Pu Chia, và cây cầu ở Pakse, Lào. Việc xây dựng các cây cầu khác đang được xem xét hoặc bắt đầu ở tỉnh Cần Thơ, Việt nam, ở Neak Luong, bến phà chính trên đường từ Nông Phênh đi TP Hồ Chí Minh, ở Xa Va Na Khét, Lào và giữa Chiang Khong, Thái Lan với Huay Xai, Lào. Trong khi đó, ở vùng thượng lưu sông Mê Kông đoạn chảy qua Kinh Hồng, Trung Quốc đang hoàn thành xây dựng cây cầu treo khổng lồ mở đường cho xe vận tải hạng nặng qua sông Mê Kông xuống mạng lưới đường bộ đang được mở rộng về phía Miến Điện, Lào và Thái Lan.

Không còn nghi ngờ gì nữa, việc xây nhiều cầu qua sông Mê Kông sẽ có ảnh hưởng lớn đến việc vận chuyển hàng hoá ở miền nam Trung Quốc và giữa các nước thuộc bán đảo đông nam châu Á. Không còn cảnh chậm trễ vì đợi phà nữa nên có vẻ như cố chấp khi nói rằng không phải mọi khía cạnh của việc xây dựng cầu đã làm hoặc đang làm đều là tốt. Lấy ví dụ cầu Mỹ Thuận bắc qua một nhánh chính của sông Mê Kông ở miền nam Việt Nam sẽ hoàn thành vào cuối năm 2000. Đây là dự án tài trợ trọn gói lớn nhất từ trước đến nay của chính phủ Úc, hơn 39 triệu đô la Mỹ, chiếm 2/3 tổng giá trị cây cầu. Khi hoàn thành, cầu sẽ dài 1,5 km với nhịp chính dài 660 m.

Hiện tại người ta vượt qua con nước mà cầu đang được xây bằng một đội phà. Mỗi ngày những chiếc phà này vận chuyển hơn 2000 lượt người và khoảng 4 ngàn tấn hàng hoá. Khi tôi qua phà, tháng 6 năm 1998, không ít hơn 6 chiếc phà qua lại như con thoi phục vụ dòng người và xe cộ đông đúc hướng về TP Hồ Chí Minh và TP Cần Thơ, trung tâm lớn của đồng bằng sông Mê Kông. Cảnh bến phà thật là ấn tượng, mọi người chen chúc nhau giành chỗ ở bến phà cả hai bên bờ sông, nơi mà các nhân viên bến phà cấm cảu hướng dẫn, doạ nạt, phỉnh phờ dòng xe cộ vô tận cả ở trên bờ lẫn dưới phà. Xe hơi, xe tải, xe buýt chen chúc nhau, cùng với hằng hà sa số người đi xe đạp và đi bộ. Không hiểu sao, vẫn có trật tự từ đám đông rõ ràng là lộn xộn đó. Mặc dù qua sông bằng phà cũng rất tốt, một cây cầu hiển nhiên làm cho việc qua sông nhanh và dễ dàng hơn. Những điều tôi chứng kiến làm tôi hiểu ngay lập tức tại sao chính phủ Việt Nam lại nhiệt tình đến thế với việc Úc tài trợ cầu Mỹ Thuận như một dự án trọn gói. Và không còn nghi ngờ gì về tầm quan trọng của việc giao thông dễ dàng đối với nông dân và người nuôi cá vùng đồng bằng sông Mê Kông trong vận chuyển hàng nhanh hỏng lên TP Hồ Chí Minh nhanh hơn, đúng hạn hơn.

Nhưng không phải ai cũng đồng tình với ý kiến cầu Mỹ Thuận là cái cần phải xây. Thật ra, khi các thành viên của chính phủ Úc đương quyền còn là phe đối lập, trước 1996, người đại diện của họ về các vấn đề quốc tế, Alexander Downer, hiện Bộ trưởng Ngoại giao, đã lớn tiếng chỉ trích dự án xây cầu và cho rằng có nhiều cách tốt hơn để Úc giúp đỡ Việt Nam chứ không phải đặt toàn bộ nguồn tài chính có thể vào một dự án duy nhất. Ông ta chỉ trích cách lí giải của chính phủ Úc lúc đó do Đảng Lao động lãnh đạo rằng cây cầu tự thân nó có giá trị đồng thời là một dịp nữa để chứng tỏ, giống như trong trường hợp cây cầu Hữu Nghị nối Thái Lan và Lào, các công ty Úc có tay nghề đảm nhận các công trình xây dựng cơ sở hạ tầng lớn. Ông Alexander gợi ý, số tiền đó nên chăng để rải ra nhiều dự án nhỏ trong một phạm vi vùng rộng lớn hơn. Đây cũng là ý kiến của nhiều tổ chức phi chính phủ Úc đặt câu hỏi về tính ưu việt của việc đặt toàn bộ, hoặc hầu như toàn bộ vốn đầu tư vào một dự án theo kiểu được ăn cả ngã về không như vậy. Nhưng có lẽ ấn tượng nhất là sự không đồng tình của một viện sĩ đáng kính nhất Việt Nam, cựu đại biểu quốc hội, phó hiệu trưởng Trường Đại học Cần Thơ, giáo sư Võ Tòng Xuân.

Chuyên gia nông nghiệp Võ Tòng Xuân không ngần ngại bầy tỏ quan điểm về phát triển kinh tế Việt Nam không phải lúc nào cũng phù hợp với quan điểm của các lãnh đạo ở Hà Nội. Các lập luận chỉ trích việc xây dựng cầu của giáo sư có sức thuyết phục hơn vì ông công nhận cây cầu thực sự có mang lại một số lợi ích, nhưng vấn đề mà giáo sư chỉ ra là có những cách tốt hơn để dùng một khoản tiền lớn như vậy thay vì đặt vào một dự án xây cầu. Giáo sư lập luận rằng sẽ có nhiều lợi ích hơn cho nông dân vùng đồng bằng sông Cửu Long nếu xây nhiều cầu nhỏ có khả năng chịu được xe cơ giới đi qua. Những cầu này sẽ nối các làng trong vùng hiện phải dùng cầu hẹp dành cho người đi bộ bắc qua kênh, lạch. Nếu làm như vậy, giáo sư nói, sẽ khuyến khích được sự phát triển vùng hơn là xây một cây cầu lớn chưa từng có nối với TP Hồ Chí Minh. Hơn nữa, do vận chuyển gạo bằng xe tải thay vì bằng thuyền lên TP Hồ Chí Minh làm giá thành vận chuyển đắt hơn và góp phần làm tắc nghẽn giao thông vốn đang là vấn đề, giáo sư tin rằng một phương án tốt hơn nữa là dùng vốn tài trợ của Úc để cải tạo bến bãi trong vùng đồng bằng sông Cửu Long. Làm vậy sẽ xuất khẩu được gạo trực tiếp từ từ vùng sản xuất.

Cân nhắc các khả năng

Hiển nhiên là cây cầu mà bài đọc này đề cập đến đang được xây dựng và bạn có thể sẽ dùng cây cầu này và nhận ra sự thuận tiện mà nó mang đến cho đồng bằng sông Cửu Long. Tuy nhiên, nhằm mục đích tranh luận hãy cùng cân nhắc các khả năng. Chính phủ Úc đã đầu tư 39 triệu đô la Mỹ vào việc xây dựng cầu. Hãy kẻ chia đôi một mảnh giấy, một bên ghi tựa “Tán thành” và bên kia ghi “Phản đối”. Bên “Tán thành” để ghi những ý kiến về lợi ích của việc xây cầu, bên “Phản đối” ghi những lí do chống lại. Sau đó đọc nhanh bài đọc này và liệt kê những thuận lợi và khó khăn vào hai cột. Bạn có thể ghi chú những lập luận nào là tán thành theo quan điểm của Úc và những lập luận tán thành nào là theo quan điểm Việt Nam. Sau khi liệt kê từ bài đọc, hãy kê thêm những ý kiến của riêng mình.

Nhiều cầu bắc qua sông Mê Kông đang được xây hoặc đang được dự trù. Hãy thảo luận trên lớp về những ưu tiên phát triển và về giao thong đường sông. Giáo sư Xuân có một số lập luận rất thuyết phục về bến bãi đường sông ở khu vực. Ý kiến của bạn thế nào?

Taking It Further

(Journal Writing, Extra Assignments, Special Explorations, Creative Endeavors):

Messing With the Mekong
by Lisa Mastny
(excerpted from the November/December 2003 World Watch magazine,
published by Worldwatch Institute. www.worldwatch.org)

The day after arriving at the Laotian river port of Huay Xai, my friend and I left our guesthouse at sunrise and walked down the street to the main pier. The boat landing, a crumbling concrete ramp about 50 feet long, was already bustling. Uniformed dockworkers methodically passed burlap sacks hand over hand from the deck of a wooden rice barge onto a rusted flatbed truck. At the bottom of the ramp, a man slowly backed his puttering tree-wheeled taxi into the brown water and began flushing grit from the cab.

We had bought tickets for the “slow boat” down the Mekong River, a two-day voyage from Huay Xai on the Thai-Lao border, to Luang Prabang, Laos’s former royal capital. Our guidebook, barely a year old, warned of the discomforts of the journey, which we were to share with the usual river cargo: sacks of grain, chickens in battered wooden cages, crates of beer, and other assorted cargo. Yet we were excited by the prospect.

Our excitement faded fast, however, as more and more travelers like ourselves, bearing dusty backpacks and worn guidebooks strolled down the ramp. As we settled into our boat--a long wooden barge like the others, but painted a vibrant green and orange--it was clear that things were changing in this remote part of the world. The renovated boat offered rows of numbered blue benches “for the convenience of tourists.” Not a chicken crate in sight.

On the river, though, it was easy to ignore any changes to traditional Mekong life. Our captain maneuvered expertly between the steep, thickly forested banks, dodging the frequent rocks and rapids. The landscape seemed almost pre-human but for the fishing traps rigged along the eroding shoreline--bamboo stalks bent under the weight of rocks that, when triggered, would catapult onto unsuspecting fish. A few fishermen tooled around the eddies, checking nets and lines for catfish and other aquatic catch. At a rock jetty, we slowed to let on a young girl in a white blouse and embroidered blue sarong, who settled among our backpacks with her own cargo--a wriggling plastic sack full of frogs destined for markets, and cooking pots, downstream.

It was almost impossible to imagine any other way of life along this rugged river. Yet Laos’s Mekong residents are in for a rude awakening--particularly if their powerful upstream neighbor, China, continues to have its way with planned developments in the vast river basin.

IMPPROVING MEKONG NAVIGATION

More than 130 years ago, a French expedition set off upriver from the Mekong delta in what is now Vietnam with a single mission: find an inland water route to China. But France’s commercial ambitions were thwarted. From its source in the Tanggula Mountains on the Tibetan plateau, the 4,800-kilometer Mekong River winds southeasterly along a riverbed dotted with jagged rocks, looming sandbars, and deadly whirlpools. In the 1930s, after minor channel improvements, it still took 37 days to sail from the South China Sea to northern Laos--a voyage that British Naval Intelligence reported took longer than sailing to France.

Still today, small ferries and cargo boats of 60 to 100 tons ply the waters of the upper Mekong, sailing by day when the obstacles are more visible. (Like the other boats, for safety reasons our tourist barge pulled over for the night at Pakbeng, a one-road village lined with tottering clapboard houses; on average, 10 shipwrecks occur per year along the Mekong in Laos alone.) During the dry season (November to May) sections above Luang Prabang remain virtually unnavigable, with water levels falling to just half a meter. Downstream along the Lao-Cambodian border, the spectacular Khone Falls, a six-mile stretch of rapids near the legendary “area of 4,000 islands,” prevents vessel passage entirely.

These natural impediments have sheltered the largely free-flowing Mekong from the fate of many of the world’s large rivers, which have long been exploited for shipping and trade. But not for long. In 1992, China initiated plans for waterway alterations that would open up northern segments of the river to year-around navigation by large cargo ships. The $5 million Upper Mekong Navigation Improvement Project involves dynamiting 21 of the most treacherous shoals, rapids, and reefs along a 331-kilometer stretch of the river, from the Sino-Burmese border to Huay Xai.

China ’s primary objective is to facilitate the export of raw materials and other trade goods from its land-locked province of Yunnan to ports in Thailand, Laos, and the rest of Southeast Asia. If fully implemented, the dredging and subsequent channelization would more than double the annual shipping capacity of the Mekong--from 4 million tons in 2001 to 10 million tons by 2007--allowing passage of as many as a dozen 500-ton ships daily.

TRADE BENEFITS FOR WHOM?

Laos, Burma, and Thailand formally agreed to the improvements in 2000, when the three countries and China signed a navigation agreement (historically significant as their first formal collaboration since before World War I) that allows ships registered with any of the signatories to trade freely along the Mekong River for 886 kilometers, from the southern Chinese port of Simao to Luang Prabang in Laos. Each country also pledged to develop ports along the river and to facilitate both the passage of vessels and customs procedures.

Like its neighbors, Laos is pinning its hopes on the economic prospects of the Mekong. Mountainous and landlocked, it is the poorest country in Southeast Asia and lags at least 30 years behind its prosperous neighbor Thailand on most economic and social indicators. Over the past century, it has suffered the burdens of French imperialism, a heavy-handed communist regime, and the Vietnam War, and is now trying desperately to catch up. Although still a communist state, Laos abandoned central planning a decade ago and has aggressively turned to free market economics in an effort to boost development. By opening the Mekong to increased trade, it hopes to benefit indirectly from China’s economic boom and to free its population of 5.2 million from a largely subsistence farming economy. (In addition to being an important trade link, the Mekong has tremendous hydropower potential that, if fully harnessed, could position Laos as the “battery” of Southeast Asia.)

Even without a new shipping channel, commerce between China’s southern provinces and Southeast Asia has grown rapidly, only accelerating with China’s entry into the World Trade Organization in 2000. In 2001, limited freight and passenger service opened between Yunnan and the Thai border town of Chiang Saen, transforming the once sleepy port into a bustling commercial zone, where 150-ton cargo ships now compete for dock space with smaller rice barges and fishing boats. Trade between China, Chiang Saen, and the downstream port of Chiang Khong, topped $88 million in 2001, double that of the previous year.

But Aviva Imhof of the International Rivers Network warns that, despite its commercial promise, dredging the Mekong may offer “few obvious benefits” for the majority of Laos’s Mekong residents. Most of the larger vessels slotted to ply the new shipping channel belong to China, which was more modern piers and facilities than its downstream neighbors. Officials in Thailand’s Chiang Rai province reported that of the more than 2,400 cargo ships entering Chiang Saen port in 2001, more than three-quarters originated in China. Villagers in Laos and Thailand fear that the incoming Chinese vessels will flood local markets with inexpensive produce, textiles, and other exports that are up to five times cheaper than domestic goods, undermining local shopkeepers and farmers.

Residents and some government officials also worry that local agriculture could be further undercut by already severe erosion of the shores. “Without the reefs, the flow in the Mekong is likely to be much stronger, and big waves caused by huge ships would destroy the country’s river banks,” warns Thonpho Vongsriprasom of the Lao Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry. Only 4 percent of Laos’s land area is suitable for agriculture (most of this along the shores of the Mekong), and many farmers rely on the fertile, sediment-enriched riverbanks for their annual harvests of lettuce, cabbage and other crops.

Like its neighbors, however, the Laotian government has downplayed these concerns for fear of rocking the boat. Chinese investments in Laos alone totaled $87 million in 1999. Laos also benefits from some $500 million in Chinese-run development projects, among them television satellite stations and the proposed Luang Prabang hospital.

In November 2001, Beijing agreed to give Laos and Burma $5 million to finance the blasting, and a Chinese company was appointed to do the work there and in Thailand. Blasting began in December 2002, and by June 2003 all but one of the 11major rapids identified for destruction under Phase One of the project had been altered. (The Thai Cabinet halted blasting of the remaining rapid because of disagreement with Laos over the location of their shared water boundary.)

ASSESSING ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS

Critics also worry about the potential environmental implications of blasting and channeling the Mekong. A joint environmental assessment, sponsored by China and completed in September of 2001, concluded that the project’s impacts would be negligible, affecting only the roughly three kilometers total where the actual detonation would occur. But the Thai watchdog group Terra and other critics have questioned the adequacy of the study. Not only was it largely technical in nature (involving mainly hydroengineers, not fisheries experts or social scientists), but it was completed in under six months and, according to Terra, represented only two days of actual field investigation.

In October 2001, the Mekong River Commission (the five-country body that oversees regional management of the river, of which China is the only basin country that is not a member) sponsored its own expert review of the assessment. Reviewer Brian Finlayson of the University of Melbourne’s Centre for Environmental Applied Hydrology noted the “paucity of basic data and information and the sketchy and unsupported nature of the analyses.” Critics with Australia’s Monash University noted the study’s failure to adequately assess long-term effects on Mekong hydrology, ecosystems, and communities, including possible contamination from heightened use and economic activity.

Other reviewers voiced their concerns about the project’s consequences for Mekong fisheries. Which are already in decline along many stretches of the river? Bob McDowall, with New Zealand’s National Institute of Water & Atmospheric Research, noted that the study lacked not only published lists of fish species and descriptions of their habitats and life histories, but also any investigation of their biological values.

Laos ’s trade minister, Soulivong Daravong, told Reuters last April that the blasting would have only a small effect on fisheries, which “can be accepted because it is not big harm.” But local fishers and villagers worry more about the longer-term consequences of altering the river. The Mekong supplies about 80 percent of the dietary protein consumed in the Mekong basin, which has a total population of more than 65 million. In Laos, where fish is still the leading source of food, the river is a lifeline.

Fishers already complain that waves from the bigger barges topple their boats and interfere with traditional fishing methods. But the greatest damage, ecologists say, would occur below the surface. The Mekong’s treacherous rapids impede shipping, yet they provide critical habitat for hundreds of species of migratory fish that dart from one rock shelter to the next as they move up the river to feed and breed. The turbulent waters also break up leaves, branches, tree trunks, and other vegetable matter on the river, nourishing the aquatic food web.

The World Conservation Union (IUCN) estimates that the Mekong is third only to the Amazon and Congo rivers in biological diversity. The rocks and rapids near Thailand’s Chiang Khong are the only known spawning grounds of the endangered giant catfish, which can weigh more than 300 kilograms and reach three meters in length. And kai, a high-protein weed that grows on the riverbed, is an important food source for both fish and humans. Scientists estimate that more than 1,200 species of fish live in the Mekong, though the full diversity of fish, plant, mollusk, and other aquatic life is still unknown.

In February 2003, the Southeast Asian Rivers Network (SEARIN). The Laotian government, and IUCN sponsored their own three-day survey of the upper Mekong. It identified 80 distinct fish species and 70 bird species along a 100-meter segment in Laos and Thailand. But some fear that this attempt to gather “baseline” ecological data on the region, occurring after the blasting began, may be too late.

SIGNS OF PROTEST—AND HOPE?

Despite growing concern, resistance to the navigation project has emerged slowly, particularly in Laos, where the Communist leadership has discouraged public opposition. “People directly affected by the blasting have been excluded from the planning process, with no forum to express their opinions or influence decision-making,” notes International River Network’s Imhof.

SEARIN, which has also criticized the project, reports that most local residents knew nothing about it until the blasting began in 2002 and people began to notice increased erosion, higher sediment levels, and strange disruptions of the water flow. The “public awareness drive” required by the environmental impact assessment reportedly took only five days and excluded the general public, interest groups, and even local government agencies. (Nor were any of the results from the consultation given for Laos or Burma.) In some affected areas of Laos, the government was forced to boost its military presence following local protests and complaints.

Communities in neighboring countries have been much more vocal. In June 2002, more than 12,000 people in northern Thailand rallied to oppose the blasting plan, primarily on environmental grounds, according to Chirasok Intayos of the Chiang Kong Conservation Group. In Burma, 52 organizations also petitioned Thai and Lao governments in December, arguing that the project would benefit only business elites and the military, and urging officials to pressure China to drop the project. Most residents would prefer to see new roads or the use of smaller barges as an alternative to the shipping channel.

There are signs that China may be listening. In late 2002, the country ratified its first-ever law requiring comprehensive environmental impact assessments for large infrastructure projects. Last June, China announced that it would scale back the blasting, abandoning the navigation project at the first stage rather than continuing with the more invasive widening that would clear the river for 500-ton vessels. Authorities claimed they were satisfied with the navigation channel gained so far. But they also cited the increased public and international scrutiny, including the growing concerns of downstream countries about livelihood impacts as well as calls from the Mekong River Commission to halt the project until a more comprehensive environmental assessment was available.

But many of the project critics fear that this doesn’t necessarily mean an end to the Chinese plan. “If Chinese authorities really want to complete the project, they will be able to press ahead regardless,” says Aviva Imhof. She notes that China’s longstanding refusal to join the Mekong River Commission continues to bode poorly for regional governance of the river. “It’s a question of China trying to extend its influence economically throughout the region,” Imhof says. Nevertheless, she agrees that the country’s tolerance of the commission’s demands for a new impact assessment is a good sign.

BEYOND THE BLASTING

Even if its navigation plans are scaled back, China has plenty more changes in store for its downstream neighbors. China has a long history of grand infrastructure projects, from the Great Wall to the nearly completed Three Gorges Dam, the world’s largest. Indeed, regulating the river channel may prove one of the least disruptive of a series of Chinese plans to “improve” the Mekong.

As with the Three Gorges Dam, controversy is brewing around China’s plans for at least eight dams along the Mekong in southern China—which could have even more serious consequences for downstream livelihoods, fisheries, and water levels. During the dry season, the river depends almost entirely on melt waters from Chinese glaciers. Damming the Mekong would disrupt its natural flooding cycle, blocking the flow of sediment to the fertile floodplains downstream and making it even harder for farmers to regulate the timing of their riverbank planting.

With two of the dams already built and the third due for completion in 2012, villagers already report fluctuations in the water levels. During the dry season last December, Thai villagers saw their vegetable plots destroyed by unexpected flooding—which occurred shortly after China opened the floodgates of one of its upstream dams to raise water levels for cargo ships. Critics say China Doesn’t always tell downstream countries when the water releases will occur, and its non-membership in the MRC leaves it still calling the shots.

Moreover, China has readily embraced international cooperation in the so-called Greater Mekong Sub-Region, a $40 billion program initiated by the Asian Development Bank in 1992 to bring superhighways, power transmission grids, large dams, and tourism to the Mekong basin. And last year, China signed an agreement with member of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations to create the world’s largest free trade zone. China’s clear interest in sustaining its high economic growth rates may not bode well for the people living along the Mekong’s banks.

Lisa Mastny is a research associate at the Worldwatch Institute.

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Information Technology

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See the same section under Listening/Speaking chapter 2 of the same level.

TOEFL Exercises

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These exercises draw upon an article by Lisa Mastny, “Messing with the Mekong,” Worldwatch magazine. DC: Worldwatch Institute (November/December 2003), pp. 21-28. See www.worldwatch.org.

Directions : In this section, you will read two passages. Each one is followed by a number of questions about the passage. You are to choose the one best answer, A, B, C, or D, to each question. Answer all questions about the information in a passage on the basis of what is stated or implied in that passage.

Example :

The railroad was not the first institution to impose regularity on society, or to draw attention to the importance of precise timekeeping. For as long as merchants have set out their wares at daybreak and communal festivities have been celebrated, people have been in rough agreement with their neighbors as to the time of day. The value of this tradition is today more apparent than ever. Were it not for public acceptance of a single measurement of time, social life would be unbearably chaotic.

What is the main idea of this passage?

• A. In modern society we must make time for neighbors.
• B. The traditions of society are timeless.
• C. An accepted way of measuring time is essential for society to function well.
• D. Society judges people by the times at which they conduct their activities.

The main idea of the passage is that societies need to agree about how time is measured in order to function smoothly. Therefore, you should choose answer C.

Questions 1-10 :

Laos ’s Mekong River residents are in for a rude awakening—particularly if their powerful upstream neighbor, China, continues to have its way with planned developments in the vast river basin. More than 130 years ago, a French expedition set off upriver from the Mekong delta in what is now Vietnam with a single mission: find an inland water route to China. But France’s commercial ambitions were thwarted. From its source in the Tanggula Mountains on the Tibetan plateau, the 4,800-kilometer Mekong River winds southeasterly along a riverbed dotted with jagged rocks, looming sandbars, and deadly whirlpools. In the 1930s, after minor channel improvements, it still took 37 days to sail from the South China Sea to northern Laos—a voyage that British Naval Intelligence reported took longer than sailing to France. China, today, intends to reshape the Mekong to fit modern-day commercial needs. This goal will surely change river life for its neighbors downstream.

Still today, small ferries and cargo boats of 60 to 100 tons ply the waters of the upper Mekong, sailing by day when the obstacles are more visible. During the dry season (November to May) sections above Luang Prabang remain virtually un-navigable, with water levels falling to just half a meter. Downstream along the Lao-Cambodian border, the spectacular Khone Falls, a six-mile stretch of rapids near the legendary “area of 4,000 islands,” prevents vessel passage entirely.

These natural impediments have sheltered the largely free-flowing Mekong from the fate of many of the world’s large rivers, which have long been exploited for shipping and trade. But not for long. In 1992, China initiated plans for waterway alterations that would open up northern segments of the river to year-round navigation by large cargo ships. The $5 million Upper Mekong Navigation Improvement Project involves dynamiting 21 of the most treacherous shoals, rapids, and reefs along a 331-kilometer stretch of the river, from the Sino-Burmese border to Huay Xai.

China ’s primary objective is to facilitate the export of raw materials and other trade goods from its landlocked province of Yunnan to ports in Thailand, Laos, Vietnam, and the rest of Southeast Asia. If fully implemented, the dredging and subsequent channelization would more than double the annual shipping capacity of the Mekong—from 4 million tons in 2001 to 10 million tons by 2007—allowing passage of as many as a dozen 500-ton ships daily.

1. The words “natural impediments” in the 3 rd paragraph, line 1, are closest in meaning to

• A. channelization
• B. treacherous shoals, rapids, and reefs
• C. both low water levels and rapids
• D. an “area of 4,000 islands”

2. It can be inferred from the 4 th paragraph that China’s channelization of the Mekong

• A. is to further its own self-interest and not necessarily those of other states lining the banks of this river system.
• B. is a fully cooperative project among many states.
• C. will facilitate the export of raw materials.
• D. will more than double the annual shipping capacity of the Mekong River.

3. The main idea introduced in the 1 st paragraph is

• A. China has not been diplomatic in its strategy to develop the Mekong.
• B. that globalization will certainly change the economy of Laos.
• C. that Laotians should welcome China’s brave and costly initiative to develop the Mekong.
• D. that the residents of Laos should be wary of China’s planned development of the Mekong River.

4. The author mentions 19 th and 20 th Century difficulties of passage down the Mekong River in the 1 st paragraph because

• A. China’s plans are part of a larger inter-state design to harness the Mekong for profit.
• B. China’s present ambition to create efficient travel and trade along the Mekong has been an unrealized goal of several states for more than 130 years.
• C. this is a long-term project, one that has lasted 130 years already.
• D. this project will continue to drag out for another century.

5. It can be inferred from this entire passage that

• A. the planners of the Upper Mekong Navigation Improvement Project believe they can reshape and control the flow of the Mekong for profitable human enterprise.
• B. humans can control nature, even a river system as mighty as the Mekong.
• C. due to its size and power, China need not consult with other states that border the Mekong.
• D. Vietnam has as much to fear as does Laos in terms of Chinese exploitation of the Mekong.

6. The phrase “But not for long” in the 3 rd paragraph, lines 2-3, is closest in meaning to

• A. “ fat chance”
• B. “ development will proceed quickly”
• C. “ the proposed dams for the Mekong will kill the river”
• D. “ this river system will now be exposed to exploitation”

7. It can be inferred that the projected increase in annual shipping capacity of the Mekong between 2001 and 2007 will

• A. result from improved governmental links between the various states that line the Mekong River
• B. rely upon the combined governmental efforts of Myanmar, Laos, Thailand, and China
• C. reflect secondarily an increase in Chinese exports
• D. reflect primarily an increase in Chinese exports

8. Why was the French colonial search for an inward water route to China never realized?

• A. Jagged rocks, looming sandbars, and deadly whirlpools were obstacles, but not permanent impediments.
• B. From Tibet to Vietnam’s Mekong delta, there were simply two many natural impediments that blocked the passage of French explorers.
• C. The 1870s French expedition was hampered by severe weather.
• D. The 1930s effort to sail from Vietnam to Laos was defeated by British intelligence.

9. Which of the following does the author demonstrate in the 2 nd paragraph?

• A. Despite skills in averting river obstacles, small farmers and cargo boats still cannot travel safely below Khone Falls.
• B. China merely hopes to increase its export of raw materials and other trade goods.
• C. Small ferries and cargo boats can better navigate the Mekong than larger ships.
• D. Passage down the entire length of the Mekong is possible in the wet season, but not the dry season.

10. The main idea of the entire passage is:

• A. The Mekong River basin has long awaited the benefits of major development.
• B. Since the Chinese have carefully crafted a better development strategy than any power before, no amount of effort by downstream states can stop China’s agenda.
• C. Though major powers have long tried to navigate the entire length of the Mekong River for commercial purposes, China’s ambition since 1992 to do so is likely to more than double the Mekong’s annual shipping capacity.
• D. Laos and Myanmar should block further Chinese expansionism.

Questions 11-20 :

Like its neighbors, Laos is pinning its hopes on the economic prospects of the Mekong. Mountainous and landlocked, it is the poorest country in Southeast Asia and lags at least 30 years behind its prosperous neighbor Thailand on most economic and social indicators. Over the past century, it has suffered the burdens of French imperialism and the American-Vietnam War. It is now trying desperately to catch up. Laos has turned to free market economics in an effort to boost development. By opening the Mekong to increased trade, it hopes to benefit indirectly from China’s economic boom and to free its population of 5.2 million from a largely subsistence farming economy. The Mekong has tremendous hydropower potential that, if fully harnessed, could position Laos as the “battery” of Southeast Asia. Even without a new shipping channel, commerce between China’s southern provinces and Southeast Asia has grown rapidly. In 2001, limited freight and passenger service opened between Yunnan and the Thai border town of Chiang Saen, transforming the once sleepy port into a bustling commercial zone.

But Aviva Imhof of the International Rivers Network warns that, despite its commercial promise, dredging the Mekong may offer “few obvious benefits” for the majority of Laos’s Mekong residents. Most of the larger vessels slotted to ply the new shipping channel belong to China, which has more modern piers and facilities than its downstream neighbors. Officials in Thailand’s Chiang Rai province reported that of the more than 2,400 cargo ships entering Chiang Saen port in 2001, more than three-quarters originated in China. Villagers in Laos and Thailand fear that the incoming Chinese vessels will flood local markets with inexpensive produce, textiles, and other exports that are up to five times cheaper than domestic goods, undermining local shopkeepers and farmers.

Residents and some government officials also worry that local agriculture and habitat could be further undercut by changes to the river current, which could severely erode the river banks. “Without the reefs, the flow in the Mekong is likely to be much stronger, and big waves caused by huge ships would destroy the country’s river banks,” warns Thongpho Vongsriprasom of the Lao Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry. Only 4 percent of Laos’s land area is suitable for agriculture (most of this along the shores of the Mekong), and many farmers rely on the fertile, sediment-enriched riverbanks for their annual harvests of lettuce, cabbage, and other crops. Critics also worry about blasting and channeling the Mekong. On the one hand, an environmental assessment, sponsored by China and completed in September 2001, concluded that the project’s impacts would be small. On the other hand, the Thai watchdog group Terra and other critics have questioned the adequacy of this Chinese study. First, it was largely technical in nature, involving hydro engineers, but not fisheries experts or social scientists. Second, it was completed in less than six months and relied on only two days of field investigations.

So in response to this Chinese-sponsored study, the Mekong River Commission (MRC), the five-country body that oversees regional management of the river, of which China is the only basin country that is not a member, sponsored its own expert review of this project in October 2001. Reviewers noted the “paucity of basic data and information and the sketchy and unsupported nature of the analyses.” Others concluded that the study failed to assess long-term effects on Mekong hydrology, ecosystems, and communities, including contamination from greater use and economic activity along the river. Still other reviewers voiced their concerns about the project’s consequences for Mekong fisheries, which are already in decline along many stretches of the river. Moreover, the Chinese study lacked not only published lists of fish species and descriptions of their habitats and life histories, but also any investigation of their biological values.

The Laotian government, however, has downplayed these concerns for fear of “rocking the boat.” Chinese investments in Laos alone totaled $87 million in 1999. Laos also benefits from some $500 million in Chinese-run development projects, among them television satellite stations and the proposed Luang Prabang hospital. Plus in November 2001, Beijing agreed to give Laos and Myanmar $5 million to finance the blasting of rapids that slow easy passage down the river. By June 2003, all but one of the 11 major rapids identified for destruction under the project had been altered.

Finally, this project calls for the construction of several dams. With two of the dams already built and the third due for completion in 2012, villagers already report fluctuations in the water levels. During the dry season last December, Thai villagers saw their vegetable plots destroyed by unexpected flooding—which occurred shortly after China opened the floodgates of one of its upstream dams to raise water levels for cargo ships. Critics say China doesn’t always tell downstream countries when the water releases will occur. China’s non-membership in the MRC leaves it still calling the shots. China’s interest in sustaining its own high economic growth rates may not bode well for other people living along the Mekong’s banks.

11. Based on this reading, which of the following might account for Laotian concerns?

• A. China and Laos need stronger diplomatic relations.
• B. With the Mekong River facing the likelihood of dynamite blasting, increased commercial traffic, larger boats and waves, and an influx of cheaper products, Lao farmers and merchants are threatened on all fronts.
• C. Southeast Asian regionalization is too swift for the rate of Laos’s development.
• D. Globalization brings with it many benefits, but also the threat of greater competition from countries such as China and the United States.

12. The author believes that

• A. the Lao Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry is too pessimistic about the potential benefits of this river development project.
• B. the Thai group Terra raises environmental concerns that are shared by all governmental and non-governmental organizations.
• C. the Mekong River Commission has voiced solid questions and concerns about the speed, study methods, and thoroughness of China’s plans for developing this complex river system and habitat.
• D. there are few obvious benefits for the people of Laos.

13. It can be inferred from the 2 nd paragraph that

• A. one must thoroughly examine the costs and benefits of any development project of this size and effect.
• B. China and Laos will find ways to use the most modern technology for completing this project.
• C. Vietnam, Laos, and Thailand must unite to stop the influx of cheaper Chinese imports.
• D. at least 75% of the trade at Chiang Saen port is strictly for the benefit of China.

14. The word “battery” in the 1 st paragraph, line 9, is closest in meaning to

• A. hydropower consumer
• B. fuel source
• C. flashlight or beacon
• D. hydropower generator

15. The author mentions the Lao government’s fear of “rocking the boat” in the 5 th paragraph, line 1, because

• A. it cannot stand in the way of Chinese development aid and project investments.
• B. of concerns about the size of waves from Chinese merchant ships, which would turn over smaller vessels on the river.
• C. it cannot impede the flow of investment on account of globalization.
• D. it would risk too much if it protested this regional development plan.

16. What is the main point of the 3 rd and 4 th paragraphs?

• A. The Mekong River Commission is staunchly opposed to this development project.
• B. Several governmental and non-governmental agencies have determined that this project poses substantial agricultural and habitat risks.
• C. The Lao Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry will do whatever it must to protect the arable land of Laos.
• D. This project will go ahead, regardless of local and regional concerns.

17. Why did Lao indicate its willingness to go along with China’s proposed development of the Mekong?

• A. Given its geographic and economic hardships, Lao sees that it has little choice but to support this historic opportunity for the Mekong’s development.
• B. Given Lao’s level of poverty, the government agrees with China that this commercial project will be of equal benefit to both states.
• C. Given the low economic activity of Lao farmers and merchants, the Lao government expects that China will present a model of modernization and trade.
• D. Given the encouragement of many non-governmental groups, such as Terra and the MRC, the Lao government was convinced that this project was good for its people.

18. Which of the following concerns does the author address in the final paragraph?

• A. Even in its initial damming and flooding projects, China has not shown that it acts in a trustworthy and predictable manner.
• B. China’s clear interest is in sustaining high economic growth for all Mekong residents.
• C. The MRC has been able to stop Chinese plans that threaten the agriculture and habitat of many downstream residents along the Mekong.
• D. This river development project is already helping farmers deal with seasonal flooding.

19. The word “indicators” in the 1 st paragraph, line 3, comes closest in meaning to

• A. lists
• B. officials
• C. signposts
• D. measurements

20. The word “sleepy” in the 1 st paragraph, line 12, comes closest in meaning to

• A. resting
• B. underdeveloped
• C. tired and quiet
• D. tired and resting

"Best Answer"

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Best Answers to Guiding Questions: This section will be the same in the Listening/Speaking and Writing books chapter x. This may be posting answers online and sharing answers cross-culturally.

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